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Those who have believed in a “Catholic vote” as some unified bloc or as a consistent “swing” component of the U.S. electorate should pay close attention to the results of the 2004 presidential election. The failure of John F. Kerry, the first major party Catholic candidate since John F. Kennedy, to definitively win the votes of those in the electorate who share his faith should finally put to rest the myth of a Catholic presidential vote. The research presented here indicates that it was also a myth that most Catholics were primarily motivated in 2004 by “moral values” in making their presidential choice at the ballot box. Using survey data from the 1960, 2000, and 2004 elections, we show that partisanship has grown to trump faith for Catholic voters due to a combination of demographic factors, changes within the Catholic Church, and changes within the U.S. party system. The defining features of anything that one might call the Catholic vote are in its fractures, not its wholeness.

Christian Right Organizations in the 1990s have tried to avoid the pitfalls for the religious particularism that undermined the earlier efforts of such groups as Moral Majority to build long lasting political coalitions. For many Christian Right leaders, conservative Catholics appear to be a particularly appealing group to reach for membership recruitment and political coalition‐building. Yet such leading groups as the Christian Coalition have largely experienced disappointment with such efforts. This essay presents data that offer reasons why conservative Catholics might be willing to form political coalitions with activists of the Christian Right but remain reluctant to join Christian Right organizations. The findings are based on a large survey of Republican party state convention delegates in four states. The data show that Catholic delegates hold very conservative issue positions in line with Christian Right organizations, and have positive feelings toward Christian Right leaders and organizations. Yet Catholic delegates hold somewhat distinctive positions among Republicans on certain issues, and therefore remain reluctant to join the Christian Coalition and other such groups.

Recent controversies in the news over anti-Catholicism alleged by elites on both the left and the right raise the question of how perceptions of religious prejudice relate to political preferences among Catholics. Using survey data on 746 self-identified adult Catholics, we examine the extent to which they perceive anti-Catholic bias and how those perceptions are related to political party identification. Catholics were asked whether they think there is a general anti-Catholic bias in the United States and whether each of seven sociopolitical groups is "hostile," "friendly," or "neutral" toward Catholics. The likelihood of perceiving a general anti-Catholic bias in the United States and anti-Catholic hostility from liberal sociopolitical groups increases with more frequent Mass attendance. The likelihood of perceiving hostility from conservative groups is unrelated to attendance. While the perception of a general anti-Catholic bias in the United States does not predict political party identification, perceptions of hostility from liberal groups tend to predict Republican identification, and perceptions of hostility from conservative groups tend to predict Democratic identification. Though perceived hostility from liberal groups has a stronger effect on party identification, we conclude that perceptions of anti-Catholic prejudice are related to the politics of some Catholics on both the left and the right.