People often keep engaging in behaviors that used to be successful in the past but which are knowingly no longer effective in the current situation, so-called “action slips.” Such action slips are often explained with stimulus-driven processes in which behavior is caused by a stimulus-response association and without information about the outcome of the behavior. This process is contrasted with a goal-directed process in which behavior is selected because it is expected to lead to a desired outcome. Failing to act in line with changes in the outcome is taken as evidence for stimulus-driven processes. Stimulus-driven processes are assumed to get installed after overtraining and to be deployed under poor operating conditions. In line with this, previous research has found that action slips are more likely to occur after extensive training and when under time pressure. We propose an alternative goal-directed explanation according to which action slips are caused by a goal-directed process that relies on old, no longer accurate, outcome information. In the current study, participants learned four stimulus–response–outcome contingencies during a single (i.e., moderate training) or a 4-day training schedule (i.e., extensive training). Afterward, two contingencies were reversed and performance was assessed under time pressure. Results show that after extensive training, participants not only committed more action slips but also reported more old response–outcome contingencies in line with these action slips. This is consistent with the goal-directed explanation that action slips result from a reliance on old, no longer accurate outcome information.

Despite growing awareness of the benefits of large-scale open access publishing, individual researchers seem reluctant to adopt this behavior, thereby slowing down the evolution toward a new scientific culture. We outline and apply a goal-directed framework of behavior causation to shed light on this type of behavioral reluctance and to organize and suggest possible intervention strategies. The framework explains behavior as the result of a cycle of events starting with the detection of a discrepancy between a goal and a status quo and the selection of behavior to reduce this discrepancy. We list various factors that may hinder this cycle and thus contribute to behavioral reluctance. After that, we highlight potential remedies to address each of the identified barriers. We thereby hope to point out new ways to think about behavioral reluctances in general, and in relation to open access publishing in particular.

Wood et al. (2022) reviewed arguments in support of the idea that much of human behavior is habitual. In this commentary, we first point at ambiguities in the way Wood et al. referred to habits. This allows us to clarify the question that lies at the core of the debate on habits: To what extent is habitual behavior mediated by stimulus–response associations or by goal representations? We then argue that Wood et al. dismissed goal-directed explanations of habitual behavior too easily. Finally, we point out that Wood et al.’s reanalysis of our data is misleading in that a more fine-grained analysis supports rather than questions goal-directed accounts.

Meta‐analyses show low correlations between implicit attitude measures and behavior measures, suggesting that these attitude measures are weak predictors of behavior. Researchers of implicit cognition have resorted to several rescue strategies. Their most important reply, based on a traditional dual‐process theory of behavior causation, is that attitudes toward objects (positive/negative) automatically activate specific action tendencies (approach/avoidance), but that this stimulus‐driven process can be overruled by a nonautomatic goal‐directed process in which the expected utilities of action options are weighed up. According to such a theory, it makes sense to continue measuring attitudes with implicit measures, but research should also take into account the moderating role of goals and other factors. We propose an alternative dual‐process theory in which goal‐directed processes can also be automatic and count as the most important cause of behavior. According to this theory, the goal‐directed process responsible for action selection is further preceded by the detection of a stimulus‐goal discrepancy. Based on this alternative theory, we propose to no longer measure attitudes toward objects but rather to measure (a) the magnitude of stimulus‐goal discrepancies as well as (b) the expected utility of the behavior at stake, understood as the product of the values of the outcomes of the behavior, and the behavior‐outcome expectancies. Here too, implicit measures are needed because people may not always have conscious access to these constructs or be motivated to disclose them. This article is categorized under: Psychology > Theory and Methods Psychology > Emotion and Motivation Psychology > Reasoning and Decision Making

The role of nature in promoting both affective and cognitive benefits has been extensively studied in the field of environmental psychology. Two well-established theories, Stress Recovery Theory (SRT) and Attention Restoration Theory (ART), are commonly used to explain these restorative benefits. However, despite their popularity, both theories face important challenges. To address these challenges, in the current paper, we propose an alternative goal-directed account of restorative nature experiences. In our account, we consider individuals as goal-directed agents and argue that the to-be-restored states that are central to SRT and ART – stress and negative affect (in SRT) and declines in cognitive performance (in ART) – can be interpreted as discrepancies between an individual’s goals and their current situation, instead of drained affective and/or cognitive resources. We propose that affective (see SRT) and cognitive nature benefits (see ART) both arise from a process of discrepancy reduction, where nature helps individuals to reduce discrepancies between their current situation and their goals. Nature can facilitate this discrepancy reduction process through three pathways: (a) by modifying goals, (b) by modifying interpretations of the situation, or (c) by affording actions that can fulfill thwarted goals. We compare our account to SRT and ART, highlighting similarities and differences between our proposal and the two theories, and illustrate how it can guide empirical studies and real-life interventions.