The application and usage of the wireless sensor network is rapidly growing. Wireless sensor networks are normally deployed into the unattended environment where the intended user can get access of the network. The sensor nodes collect data from this environment. If the data are valuable and confidential then some security measures are needed to protect the data from the unauthorized access. In this paper, I propose an identity-based user authentication and access control protocol based on the Identity-Based Signature (IBS) scheme where the ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) based digital signature algorithm (DSA) is used for signing a message and verifying a message for a wireless sensor networks. This protocol accomplishes the registration of a new user, authentication of a user, session key establishment between sensor node and the user; and finally grants the appropriate data access to the user. User revocation is also handled in this proposed protocol. Compared with other conventional security solutions, this protocol provides confidentiality and integrity of the sensor data; and also achieves better computational, communicational performance and energy efficiency due to the use of more efficient IBS algorithms based on ECC than those based on RSA.

Various types of certificates are basic tools of modern cryptography and networks security. They are used in various protocols, in the form of public key identity certificates, binding a key to its owner or in the form of attribute certificates, being a proof of rights and capabilities of their owner. Management of certificates (creation, distribution, verification, and revocation) is dependent on a certification infrastructure comprising various certification authorities, protocols, and policies.In this paper we consider usage and management of certificates in open, ad hoc networks. Ad hoc networks differ from fixed, wired networks in several important aspects, one of them being that access to the Internet is not always available. This significantly influences certificate management protocols since online access to various certificate system resources (CA certificates, CRL, etc) is not always available. In this paper we specify security requirements and constraints in such environments and outline some potential solutions for adaptation of certificate management protocols to these new network environments.

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