In this article we investigate the relationship between legal translation and legal interpretation. The common wisdom is that these activities are closely related, but the nature of that relationship remains disputable. We adopt the perspective of legal theory—as opposed to the perspective of translation studies—which seems to be underrepresented in the literature of the subject. We start with distinguishing between the two notions of legal interpretation: the wide sense (interpretation as understanding) and the narrow sense (interpretation as problem solving). We argue that the relationship between legal translation and legal interpretation changes significantly depending on the notion of legal interpretation that is assumed. The wide sense is often assumed by translation scholars and it renders legal interpretation as a necessary prerequisite for legal translation. Jurists, on the other hand, usually assume the narrow sense which renders legal interpretation and legal translation as two distinct activities with some shared features. We then focus on four issues of legal interpretation in the narrow sense: the types of legal interpretive problems, the creation of legal interpretive problems, the methods of legal interpretation, the resolution of legal interpretive problems. We conclude with a detailed comparison of legal translation and legal interpretation in the context of those four issues.

The article is based on an observation that there are significant and non-arbitrary similarities between two, seemingly quite distant, theories that address the problem of linguistic categorization. One is the theory of open texture put forward by a prominent legal philosopher, Herbert L.A Hart. The other is the theory of prototypes, originated from psychological research by Eleanor Rosch and developed by cognitively-oriented linguists, most notably Charles Fillmore, George Lakoff, and Ronald Langacker. Firstly, the origins of the open texture theory are presented, including the discussion of Friedrich Waismann's and Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas and their impact on Hart's theory. Secondly, Hart's theory of open texture is examined, based on several articles and his masterpiece: The Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961). Thirdly, a brief introduction to the prototype theory is provided, focusing on its reception in Cognitive Linguistics. Fourthly, a comparison of both theories is presented, including a sketch of a broader philosophical and historical background, as well as a detailed analysis of similarities and dissimilarities between them. The comparison results in a conclusion that, on linguistic grounds, the open texture theory can be viewed as an anticipation of prototype theory. Finally, several reservations are made in order to avoid possible confusions and some obvious objections.

Prototype theory is a semantic theory according to which the membership of conceptual categories is based not on a list of criterial features, but rather on the similarity to the most representative member of the category. Consequently, conceptual categories may lack classical definitions and rigid boundaries. This article supports the claims, already made by other scholars working in the field, that prototype theory may greatly augment our understanding of legal (i.e. statutory, judicial) interpretation. Legal provisions are traditionally written as classical definitions, but they are rarely applied that way. Statutory concepts tend to be interpreted with a great deal of flexibility, using a wide array of extra-textual factors. This is especially true for the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which has to deal with the challenges of the multilingual, supranational law of the European Union.

Interpretative doubts in the application of law are usually born of discrepancies between the statutory language and the non-linguistic reality. Therefore, they pose the problem of categorization. The theory of law and legal practice have for centuries been dominated by the classical theory of categorization, according to which conceptual categories can be described by a set of sufficient and necessary features. In the 1970s, an American researcher Eleanor Rosch conducted a series of psychological experiments that led her to question the classical theory and lay the foundations for an alternative one, known as the prototype theory. According to this approach, conceptual categories are organized around the most typical exemplars (prototypes), and membership of a category is measured by similarity to the prototype. Some of the consequences of such view are that category membership is a gradable feature and that the borderlines of categories are fuzzy. The article presents an outline of the prototype theory in the version used in cognitive linguistics. Its usefulness for the theory and practice of statutory interpretation is tested on the basis of the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union regarding the concept of beer. In this judgment, the CJEU refused to define the concept of beer by setting requirements as to its raw material composition and ruled that beer is a product that has organoleptic characteristics of beer. This definition on the basis of classical theory appears to be tautological, however, it finds theoretical justification in the prototype theory. In conclusions, the author indicates research problems that must be taken up in order for the prototype theory to be reliably used in jurisprudence.

W interpretacji prawa karnego dużą rolę odgrywa domniemanie znaczenia powszechnego (ogólnego, potocznego) wyrażeń ustawowych. Ustalanie znaczenia powszechnego w procesie stosowania prawa odbywa się zwykle na podstawie intuicji językowej organu procesowego lub słowników. W artykule przedstawiono konkurencyjne źródło wiedzy o znaczeniu powszechnym, jakim są korpusy językowe. Wykorzystanie korpusów jako narzędzia wykładni prawa jest od kilku lat intensywnie dyskutowane w literaturze amerykańskiej. Główne zastrzeżenia zgłaszane są w kontekście prawa karnego. Artykuł zawiera przegląd głównych argumentów podnoszonych w amerykańskiej debacie i odniesienie ich do polskiej kultury prawnej. Ponadto, przedstawione zostały przykładowe analizy korpusowe na gruncie spraw karnych, zarówno w kontekście wykładni prawa, jak i oceny językowych elementów stanu faktycznego.