seventy-two years after the start of the nuclear era, 122 states concluded the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW, or ban treaty). The treaty forbids the development, production, acquisition, possession, transfer, testing, use, and threat of use of nuclear weapons. Advocates of the TPNW understand that it will not automatically lead to a world without nuclear weapons. The treaty's main goal is to stimulate a societal and political debate inside the nuclear-armed states and their allies by strengthening the antinuclear norm and by stigmatizing nuclear weapons and their possessors. This article assesses to what extent this process of stigmatization might take place. It starts by elaborating on the concepts of stigma and stigmatization. It then matches the concept of stigma with nuclear weapons, and with the humanitarian initiative behind the momentum that led to the TPNW. The article concludes by looking to different stigma management approaches that can be used by the nuclear-armed states and their allies.

This article suggests a new definition of insiders and insider threats. It refrains from applying a harmoriented perspective that concentrates on the insider's intention to cause harm because it defines the insider threat either too narrow or too broad. Instead, a privilege-oriented perspective is applied that focuses on the insider's intention to misuse his privileged access to or knowledge about the organizational assets. Because existing privilege-oriented definitions refrain from making an explicit and clear-cut division between intentional and unintentional misuse of privilege, a new conceptualization is suggested that distinguishes insider hazards from insider threats. If the insider unintentionally misuses his insider privilege, it concerns an insider hazard. If the insider intentionally misuses his insider privilege, it is regarded as an insider threat.

This article provides a four-part typology of security awareness. We argue that existing awareness typologies that distinguish problem awareness from solution awareness and that separate descriptive awareness from prescriptive awareness are on its own insufficient and need to be merged to have a complete picture of security awareness. Renaming and bridging both distinctions leads to four security awareness types: (1) Cognitive awareness of the threat; (2) Attitudinal awareness of the threat; (3) Cognitive awareness of the mitigation; and (4) Attitudinal awareness of the mitigation. Each type is subsequently explained in greater detail and illustrated by referring to the 2020 worldwide outbreak of COVID-19. Furthermore, it is demonstrated that the typology is applicable to study both organizational awareness and individual awareness.