There are obstacles to creativity: one of them is called fixation effect, the fact that some knowledge about existing or obvious solutions is spontaneously activated and constrains the generation of new solutions. Converging evidence in cognitive psychology has indicated that the ability to generate original ideas can be limited by recently activated knowledge, such as examples of solutions. On the other hand, neuroimaging studies have recently demonstrated that exposure to examples could, on the contrary, have a stimulating effect on originality. To make sense of what seems to be contradictory studies, we hypothesized that two types of examples could have opposite effects on originality: (1) restrictive examples-within the fixation effect-could lead to a reduction in the originality of the solutions, whereas (2) expansive examples-outside the fixation effect-could provoke solutions of higher originality. Results from a total of 160 participants confirmed that the solutions proposed by the group exposed to restrictive examples were less original than those given by the group exposed to expansive examples.

Dual-process theories have suggested that emotion plays a key role in the framing effect in decision-making. However, little is known about the potential impact of a specific positive or negative emotional context on this bias. We investigated this question with adult participants using an emotional priming paradigm. First, participants were presented with positive or negative affective pictures (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant photographs). Afterward, participants had to perform a financial decision-making task that was unrelated to the pictures previously presented. The results revealed that the presentation framed in terms of gain or loss no longer affected subjects' decision-making following specific exposure to emotionally pleasant pictures. Interestingly, a positive emotional context did not globally influence risk-taking behavior but specifically decreased the risk propensity in the loss frame. This finding confirmed that a positive emotional context can reduce loss aversion, and it strongly reinforced the dual-process view that the framing effect stems from an affective heuristic belonging to intuitive System 1.

Developmental cognitive neuroscience studies tend to show that the prefrontal brain regions (known to be involved in inhibitory control) are activated during the generation of creative ideas. In the present article, we discuss how a dual-process model of creativity-much like the ones proposed to account for decision making and reasoning-could broaden our understanding of the processes involved in creative ideas generation. When generating creative ideas, children, adolescents, and adults tend to follow "the path of least resistance" and propose solutions that are built on the most common and accessible knowledge within a specific domain, leading to fixation effect. In line with recent theory of typical cognitive development, we argue that the ability to resist the spontaneous activation of design heuristics, to privilege other types of reasoning, might be critical to generate creative ideas at all ages. In the present review, we demonstrate that inhibitory control at all ages can actually support creativity. Indeed, the ability to think of something truly new and original requires first inhibiting spontaneous solutions that come to mind quickly and unconsciously and then exploring new ideas using a generative type of reasoning.