No abstract

Purpose Despite lessons learned from prior disaster relief funding programs, billions of dollars in fraudulent loans were issued by the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) during the COVID-19 pandemic in the USA. The misuse of funds prevented business owners and their employees who are in true financial need from accessing program funds. The purpose of this paper is to identify techniques perpetrators used to obtain funds from the program illegally since its inception in March 2020 and concludes with suggestions on internal controls to reduce fraud occurrences in future relief packages. Design/methodology/approach The authors analyze 106 loan fraud cases reported by the US Department of Justice and compiled by the Project on Government Oversight to examine methods individuals used to illegally obtain funds from the program. The authors complement the data with lender characteristics from Call Reports and Business Insights. They further compare the fraud sample to the entire population of PPP loans, which is available on the US Small Business Administration website. The authors report descriptive statistics, correlations and multivariate regressions. Findings The authors find that most fraud cases falsify tax data to access program loans and inflate payroll numbers to obtain larger loan amounts. Applicants who sought large amounts applied using multiple companies and across multiple lenders, consistent with the use of multiple loans to avoid the scrutiny of a single large loan with a single lender. The authors find that cases with larger amounts relied on less regulated lenders, such as lending companies, rather than more regulated lenders. Originality/value The PPP is part of the largest ever US stimulus in which the private sector allocated funds. This study provides novel evidence of how fraudsters adapted to the program's rules to defraud the government.

PurposeThis study contributes to a growing body of literature on the Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) by examining how lender incentives affected prioritization of large borrowers. In addition, this study separately examines incentives for commercial banks and credit unions during the program.Design/methodology/approachUsing 2020 PPP loan data, the authors create a proxy for lender loan prioritization by comparing the skewness statistics of large and small loan distributions. A regression model is used to examine lender reporting incentives and loan prioritization.FindingsResults show that larger borrowers were prioritized in receiving PPP loans earlier. Lenders with financial reporting concerns and commercial banks favored large borrowers to a greater extent.Practical implicationsThis study may inform social planners and regulators about the benefits and costs of delegating emergency funding loan decisions to financial institutions.Originality/valueThe authors believe this paper is the first to examine financial institution reporting incentives in relationship to PPP lending practices. It adds novelty by examining lender incentives, while prior research has focused heavily on the economic consequences of the program and how borrower–lender relationships affected loan practices during the program.

We provide evidence that lenders with lower regulatory capital issue loans with lower financial covenant strictness, consistent with such lenders viewing borrower covenant violations as costlier. This is because a borrower covenant violation may lead the lender to downgrade the loan, which triggers accounting that further reduces regulatory capital. Because of regulatory scrutiny, this is true even if the lender waives the violation. We find that this association is concentrated in performance covenants rather than capital covenants. We also find that lenders with relatively low capital issue loans with lower amounts and shorter maturities, consistent with such lenders replacing covenant protection with stricter loan terms on other dimensions. Finally, we find that this form of lender capital management extends to loan syndicate participant lenders, in that participants with relatively low capital adequacy take smaller loan shares when the lead arranger sets high covenant strictness. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G21; M40; M41.

This paper describes how behavioral biases influence the resolution of financial covenant violations. Prior literature documents that violation waivers are common; however, there is a lack of discussion on the determinants that lead loan officers to waive covenant violations. We rely on the escalation of commitment bias (or the sunk cost phenomenon) to discuss how loan officers may become attached to a selected course of action and fail to incorporate new information, increasing the likelihood of covenant waivers. We explain the implications of this bias on bank financial reports by detailing how accounting links loan quality to bank financial statements. We further draw on the psychology literature to offer potential solutions to mitigate overcommitment in the context of loan officers. Future research can examine the extent to which loan officers knowingly or unknowingly steer away from rational decision-making. This study has practical implications as users of bank financial reports, including investors, auditors, examiners, and bank managers, learn about processes and challenges on how accounting mechanics link bank loan portfolios to financial statements.