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Several commentators have recently attributed conflicting accounts of the relation between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination to Husserl. Some say he is a proponent of the conjunctive view that the two kinds of experience are fundamentally the same. Others deny this and purport to find in Husserl distinct and non-overlapping accounts of their fundamental natures, thus committing him to a disjunctive view. My goal is to set the record straight. Having first briefly laid out the problem under discussion and the terms of the debate, I then review the proposals that have been advanced, disposing of some and marking others for further consideration later in the paper. A. D. Smith's disjunctive reading is among the latter. I discuss it at length, arguing that Smith fails to show that Husserl's views on perceptual experience entail a form of disjunctivism. Following that critical discussion, I present a case for a conjunctive reading of Husserl's account of perceptual experience.

In order to gauge the pedagogical implications of conducting Computer Science practical sessions remotely, the Division of ICS at Macquarie University conducted a formal experiment using a virtual classroom environment called Macromedia Breeze Live. Research results indicated that students who completed their practical in the virtual classroom: i) felt they performed significantly more collaboration, ii) expressed a preference for this mode of practical session over regular laboratory sessions, iii) felt that they learnt significantly more from their classmates and iv) felt that they learnt significantly more from the practical supervisor than students in the standard classroom. Reasons for these results are proposed in the pedagogical context of offering Computer Science practical sessions online.

In this paper I explore a curious phenomenon discussed in Husserl's later manuscripts under the name "pre-world.'' This notion arises in the context of his ongoing develop ment of a genetic phenomenology, i.e" a phenomenology that is concerned with the dynamics of conscious life, concerning both the generation of new meaning for con sciousness and new dimensions of conscious life. The pre-world is one such dimen sion. I explore it here in two stages. First, I consider the initial unsavoriness of the very idea of a pre-world, whose metaphysical implications are suspect, on the surface. Nevertheless, I show that the pre-world puts the subject in contact with reality in a very special sense that should remedy this worry. Second, I show how the notion of the pre-world re-opens Husserl's thought of the possible annihilation of the world from Ideas I. In fact, it explains the possibility, by revealing its experiential ground.

Despite extensive discussion of naïve realism in the wider philosophical literature, those influenced by the phenomenological movement who work in the philosophy of perception have hardly weighed in on the matter. It is thus interesting to discover that Edmund Husserl’s close philosophical interlocutor and friend, the early twentieth-century phenomenologist Johannes Daubert, held the naive realist view. This article presents Daubert’s views on the fundamental nature of perceptual experience and shows how they differ radically from those of Husserl’s. The author argues, in conclusion, that Daubert’s views are superior to those of Husserl’s specifically in the way that they deal with the phenomenon of perceptual constancy.