When do states concede to coercive threats? While the majority of research has focused on the states initiating these challenges, comparatively little attention has been given to the targets, the states that actually face the choice of whether to stand firm or back down. My project examines the role that a target's regime-type, broadly construed as democratic versus non-democratic states, plays in the decision-making process, arguing that democracies are more likely to concede when threatened due to the higher costs they pay for foreign policy failure and the relative ease that challengers have in identifying whether democracies are vulnerable to coercion. Further, my argument also extends to the role of democratic allies, who are less reliable when threats of violence are employed against their protégés. I employ statistical evidence with data from the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) and Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions (TIES) datasets to show the broad validity of my claims, as well as in-depth case studies, namely the Munich and Suez Crises, to demonstrate how my theory works in practice. AcknowledgementsI owe a great deal of thanks to many people who have helped shape this dissertation.My first and greatest debt belongs to Todd Sechser, the chair of my dissertation committee.Todd has been an excellent advisor, helping me along when I had only the faintest ideas of what my project would be about. I had always been fascinated with coercion since the first time I read Thomas Schelling's Arms and Influence, so to find that Todd similarly loved Schelling's work was when I knew he would be a superb chair for my committee. His insights and advice throughout my time at the University of Virginia played a critical role shaping me into the scholar I am today, and I am only better for it.The first class I took in international relations at UVA was with John Owen, who I quickly learned was not only a brilliant advisor but also one of the kindest people that I have been fortunate enough to meet in academia. I came to John early on in my third year with vague ideas of how I wanted to approach my dissertation, and he played a critical role in helping me piece together what eventually became the main thesis. Always able to make time for a meeting with me, no matter when I happened to be in town or for how long, Iwill always appreciate the impact that he had on shaping not my research but my view of international relations theory; I came in as a pretty hardcore realist, and I like to think that John played a large role in tempering that inclination (for better or for worse).When I first arrived at the University of Virginia, I was luck enough to have Dale Copeland as my advisor. I rapidly came to appreciate Dale's deep respect and love for history, which became invaluable as I thought through the case studies for my dissertation.His emphasis on how politics change over time helped a great deal as I considered the potential for learning in my own argument. And his joy at just sitting back and talking ...