The article is focused on the analysis of flexicurity arrangements in the Italian case with a twofold aim. The first aim is substantive: analysing and evaluating recent labour market reforms in Italy with particular reference to the possible emergence of a new flexicurity model. The second goal is to contribute to the debate on labour market development and flexicurity by enriching and refining the available analytical tools. More specifically, we argue that the traditional conceptual ‘lenses’ focusing on the ‘insiders’/‘outsiders’ divide are inadequate to grasp the ongoing changes in the Italian labour market. This leads us to identify a third category of workers, the ‘mid-siders’, who are increasingly relevant in the Italian case and may prove to be relevant in other labour markets too. Moreover, we introduce the concept of ‘selective flexicurity’, referring to the fact that in the Italian case flexibility and security measures have been applied differently across the various categories of workers.

Italy and Poland present similarly weak minimum income protection models, yet this results from two different policy trajectories in the last 15 years: both countries actually introduced a minimum income scheme (MIS) between the late 1990s (Italy) and the early 2000s (Poland), but later developments were characterized by policy reversal in the Italian case vis-à-vis institutionalization in Poland. The paper therefore addresses two intertwined puzzles. First, in the light of very different background conditions, which factors help understand the convergent process towards the introduction of MIS? Second, what explains remarkable divergence in the subsequent phase? Challenging previous claims about the limited scope of political competition dynamics in the field of social assistance, due to generally narrow constituencies and limited political mobilization, we contend that political competition dynamics are key factors in order to make sense of both convergent and divergent trajectories in the two diverse phases.

The supranational strategy ‘Europe 2020’ came along with two main innovations for social policy coordination in the EU: a quantified poverty reduction target and a new governance framework – the ‘European Semester’. Aiming to assess the effectiveness of the novel strategy in prompting the emergence of a European(‐ized) anti‐poverty arena – thus inherently multilevel and multi‐stakeholder, as well as integrated (across policy sectors) – the article first presents the strategy evolution at the supranational level in 2011–14. Then it analyzes its implementation in five member states – Germany, Italy, Poland, Sweden and the UK – through the first four annual cycles. By directing the analytical focus on processes – rather than outcomes – in order to capture the domestic changes produced by the Europe 2020 anti‐poverty strategy, the article argues that the latter marked significant discontinuity with the Social Inclusion Open Method of Coordination. The new strategy increased the political salience of the poverty issue both at the supranational level and in the selected member states, while leading to a ‘competence clash’ between national governments and the EU in Germany, Sweden and the UK. The emergence of such main tension substantially constrained the Europe 2020 potential in these three countries. Differently, in Italy and Poland, the implementation was smoother and the effects along the participation and integration dimensions were more evident. We contend that national policy legacies, the relevance of EU social funds, as well as partisan preferences, help to explain the differential effects of Europe 2020. The article concludes by suggesting that recent decisions at the EU level might eventually bring European anti‐poverty coordination beyond soft‐law towards ‘hybrid’ governance solutions.

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