We empirically assess the implications of the common ownership hypothesis from a historical perspective using the set of S&P 500 firms from 1980 to 2017. We show that the dramatic rise in common ownership in the time series is driven primarily by the rise of indexing and diversification and, in the cross section, by investor concentration, which the theory presumes to drive a wedge between cash flow rights and control. We also show that the theory predicts incentives for expropriation of undiversified shareholders via tunneling, even in the Berle and Means (1932) world of the widely held firm. (JEL D22, G32, G34, L21, L25)

We study patterns of behavior in bilateral bargaining situations using a rich new data set describing back-and-forth sequential bargaining occurring in over 25 million listings from eBay’s Best Offer platform. We compare observed behavior to predictions from the large theoretical bargaining literature. One-third of bargaining interactions end in immediate agreement, as predicted by complete-information models. The majority of sequences play out differently, ending in disagreement or delayed agreement, which have been rationalized by incomplete information models. We find that stronger bargaining power and better outside options improve agents’ outcomes. Robust empirical findings that existing models cannot rationalize include reciprocal (and gradual) concession behavior and delayed disagreement. Another robust pattern at odds with existing theory is that players exhibit a preference for making and accepting offers that split the difference between the two most recent offers. These observations suggest that behavioral norms, which are neither incorporated nor explained by existing theories, play an important role in the success of bargaining outcomes.

We outline an empirical framework to guide the analyses of signaling games and focus on three key features: sorting of senders, incentive compatibility of senders, and belief updating of receivers. We apply the framework to answer the following question: Can sellers credibly signal their private information to reduce frictions in negotiations? We argue that some sellers use round numbers to signal their willingness to cut prices in order to sell faster. Using millions of online bargaining interactions we show that items listed at multiples of $100 receive offers that are 8%-12% lower but are 15%-25% more likely to sell, demonstrating an incentive-compatibility trade-off. We then show evidence consistent with sorting and belief updating inherent to cheap-talk models. Patterns in real estate transactions suggest that round-number signaling plays a role in negotiations more generally. JEL classifications: C78, D82, D83, M21. * We thank Panle Jia Barwick, Willie Fuchs, Brett Green, Jakub Kastl, and Greg Lewis for helpful discussions, and many seminar participants for helpful comments. We are grateful to Chad Syverson for sharing data on real estate transactions in the State of Illinois. This paper was previously circulated under the title "Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation."

Schmalz, and Glen Weyl. All remaining errors are our own. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w25454.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.