We model the market for news as a two-sided market where newspapers sell news to readers who value accuracy and sell space to advertisers who value advert-receptive readers. In this setting, monopolistic newspapers under-report or bias news that sufficiently reduces advertiser profits. Paradoxically, increasing the size of advertising eventually leads competing newspapers to reduce advertiser bias. Nonetheless, advertisers can counter this effect if able to commit to news-sensitive cut-off strategies, potentially inducing as much bias as in the monopoly case. We use these results to explain contrasting historical and recent evidence on commercial bias and influence in the media. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.

This innovative interprofessional educational program combines online learning with live interactive simulation to teach professionally diverse students spiritual, cultural, and interprofessional aspects of palliative care. Despite the challenge of balanced professional representation, this innovative interprofessional educational program met its learning objectives, and may be transferable for use in other educational settings.

We study experimentally how communication changes the effectiveness of contract types when sellers choose unenforceable quality after a possible cost shock. Communication potentially removes conflicting perceptions that may otherwise plague flexible contracts. Indeed, we find that introducing free-form communication sharply reverses an advantage of rigid contracts in favor of flexible contracts, which then deliver much higher earnings. Control treatments that avoid selection effects reveal a strong parallel shift from rigid to flexible. Chat content analysis identifies clarification of postshock transfers, promises, and personal rapport as key correlates of high earnings, with clarification working only in conjunction with flexible contracts. A communication channel restricted to clarifying transfer plans also favors use of flexible contracts, but mildly compared to chat. (JEL: C91, D03, D86)

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election.We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when the weak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a "centrist" policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, "posturing" by the strong party leads to platform divergence.¤ We thank Timothy Feddersen, Geo¤rey Garrett, Oliver Hart, Mathias Hounkpe, Nien-He Hsieh, Elena Krasnokutskaya, Eric Maskin, Steve Morris, Roger Myerson, Martin Osborne, Ben Polak, Andrei Shleifer, Christopher Udry, Asher Wolinsky, two anonymous referees and an editor of this journal for comments and suggestions. We are also grateful for helpful comments from seminar participants at University of Michigan, Harvard University, New York University and Yale University.We are responsible for any remaining errors.

Teaching medical students to integrate patient-centered skills into the medical interview is challenging. Longitudinal training requires significant curricular and faculty time. Unsupervised students risk harm if they uncover and inappropriately manage psychosocial issues in actual patients. They fear saying the wrong thing in emotionally charged situations. Two half-day workshops for pre-clinical students integrate patient-and physician-centered interviewing. The first occurs early in the first year. The second, late in the second year, presents interview challenges (e.g., breaking bad news). Ten professional actors portray standardized patients (SPs). Groups of 10 to 15 students interview an SP, each eliciting a part of the patient's story. Qualitative evaluation revealed that, for many students, SPs afford the opportunity to experiment without harming real patients. Students view the workshops as effective (mean score for first-year students, 6.6 [standard deviation (SD), 1.0], second-year students, 7.1 [SD, 0.7] on a Likert-type scale: 1 = not at all effective to 8 = very effective).