This article examines how power-sharing institutions might best be designed to stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former adversaries following the negotiated settlement of civil wars. We identify four different forms of power sharing based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension. Employing the statistical methodology of survival analysis to examine the 38 civil wars resolved via the process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998, we find that the more dimensions of power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher is the likelihood that peace will endure. We suggest that this relationship obtains because of the unique capacity of power-sharing institutions to foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace.

This article examines how power-sharing institutions might best be designed to stabilize the transition to enduring peace among former adversaries following the negotiated settlement of civil wars. We identify four different forms of power sharing based on whether the intent of the policy is to share or divide power among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension. Employing the statistical methodology of survival analysis to examine the 38 civil wars resolved via the process of negotiations between 1945 and 1998, we find that the more dimensions of power sharing among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher is the likelihood that peace will endure. We suggest that this relationship obtains because of the unique capacity of power-sharing institutions to foster a sense of security among former enemies and encourage conditions conducive to a self-enforcing peace.

: these and other civil wars have posed seemingly intractable challenges to policymakers, scholars, and human rights groups seeking to put an end to such deadly con icts. In the wake of negotiated settlements to civil wars, one of the thorniest problems involves reassuring people who have been "killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and success" that con ict is not about to break out again, endangering people's lives.1 Those concerned with the implementation and ultimate success of negotiated settlements have debated how best to enhance the prospects of a stable peace. What arrangements, if any, can be used to persuade communities that intergroup relations will take place in a climate of relative security? Are there any mechanisms the international community might employ to discourage the resumption of violence? Is an enduring peace settlement more likely in certain environments than in others? In this research note we explore variables that help to explain the longevity of negotiated peace settlements.Analysts and policymakers interested in helping to foster a stable peace have focused on such variables as the international arena, institutional choice, the characteristics of civil con icts, the role of third parties, the process of implementation, and the principal issue (identity or politico-economic) at stake in the con ict. There is no question that this research has proven useful in terms of sensitizing scholars and practitioners to the types of factors that may have an impact on postcon ict conditions. In fact, although this emphasis on issues of post-civil war stability is fairly recent, enough work on the subject has been done to make it worthwhile to investigate systematically the in uence of key variables Our thanks to Fritz Gaenslen and David Lewis for their comments on various drafts of the article, and to James Spriggs II for his help with methodological issues. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Laila Buoniconti and the Paul H. Rhoads Teaching and Professional Development Fund of Gettysburg College.

This article considers the role that the implementation of peace agreements has on the prospects for fostering a durable peace following the negotiated resolution of civil wars. Focusing on the 16 peace agreements between 1980 and 1996 that have included provisions for the sharing or dividing of military power among former combatants, the authors find that the complete implementation of this aspect of settlements significantly improves the prospects for maintaining peace. They suggest that this proves to be the case because of the important and credible signals of conciliatory intent among former enemies that are made through the process of implementation. They find that implementation serves as a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from within their own groups. Based on these results, the authors offer policy recommendations focusing on the role that third-party actors and aid donors might play in facilitating the successful implementation of negotiated peace agreements.

Although there is now a wealth of scholarship concerning the onset, duration, and termination of civil wars, there is not nearly as much empirical research by political scientists on the potential for postconflict democratization in countries that have been the site of civil wars. This relative scholarly neglect of post–civil war democratization stands in contrast to the efforts and resources that other actors—foreign ministries, international and nongovernmental organizations, and members of civil society—have invested in attempting to help construct democracy in postconflict states such as Indonesia, Liberia, and Uganda.