In the wake of the Cold War, democracy has gained the status of a mantra. Yet there is no consensus about how to conceptualize and measure regimes such that meaningful comparisons can be made through time and across countries. In this prescriptive article, we argue for a new approach to conceptualization and measurement. We first review some of the weaknesses among traditional approaches. We then lay out our approach, which may be characterized ashistorical,multidimensional,disaggregated,andtransparent.We end by reviewing some of the payoffs such an approach might bring to the study of democracy.

Why do states provide sensitive nuclear assistance to nonnuclear weapon states, contributing to the international spread of nuclear weapons? Using a new dataset on sensitive nuclear transfers, this paper analyzes the determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. I first describe a simple logic of the differential effects of nuclear proliferation, which I use to generate hypotheses about the conditions under which states provide sensitive nuclear assistance. I then show that the strategic characteristics of the potential nuclear suppliers are the most important determinants of sensitive nuclear assistance. Explanations that emphasize the importance of economic motivations do not find support in the data. This paper presents a new approach to the study of the spread of nuclear weapons, focusing on the supply side of nuclear proliferation.

N uclear weapons have occupied a central role in international politics ever since their introduction onto the world stage in 1945. The use of nuclear weapons by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki is widely believed to have compelled Japanese surrender and brought World War II to a close. The vast nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were fundamental to the bipolar, strategic relationship that structured international politics for more than fifty years during the Cold War. And while many analysts had hoped that the collapse of the Soviet Union would lead to a reduction in the influence of nuclear weapons in international affairs, it was not to be so. The threat of nuclear proliferation resurfaced as India, Pakistan, and more recently, North Korea have conducted nuclear tests. Other regional powers, including Iran, Iraq, and Libya, are pursuing or have pursued nuclear capabilities. The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that if terrorists, intent on carrying out mass-casualty attacks, acquired nuclear weapons, the results could be catastrophic. The ease with which states or terrorists could potentially acquire sensitive nuclear materials was exemplified by the black market nuclear proliferation ring operated by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. Indeed, in his 2007 annual report to Congress on the projected threats to the national security of the United States of America, Director of National Intelligence J. Michael McConnell concluded that nuclear proliferation poses one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security. 1

Scholars have long debated whether nuclear superiority or the balance of resolve shapes the probability of victory in nuclear crises, but they have not clearly articulated a mechanism linking superiority to victory, nor have they systematically analyzed the entire universe of empirical cases+ Beginning from a nuclear brinkmanship theory framework, I develop a new theory of nuclear crisis outcomes, which links nuclear superiority to victory in nuclear crises precisely through its effect on the balance of resolve+ Using a new data set on fifty-two nuclear crisis dyads, I show that states that enjoy nuclear superiority over their opponents are more likely to win nuclear crises+ I also find some support for the idea that political stakes shape crisis outcomes+ These findings hold even after controlling for conventional military capabilities and for selection into nuclear crises+ This article presents a new theoretical explanation, and the first comprehensive empirical examination, of nuclear crisis outcomes+

Where is the power? Students of politics have pondered this question, and social scientists have scrutinized formal political institutions and the distribution of power among agencies of the government and the state. But we still lack a rich bank of data measuring the power of specific governmental agencies, particularly national legislatures. This book assesses the strength of the national legislature of every country in the world with a population of at least a half-million inhabitants. The Legislative Powers Survey (LPS) is a list of thirty-two items that gauge the legislature's sway over the executive, its institutional autonomy, its authority in specific areas and its institutional capacity. Data were gathered by means of a vast international survey of experts, extensive study of secondary sources and painstaking analysis of constitutions and other relevant documents. Individual country chapters provide answers to each of the thirty-two survey items, supplemented by expert commentary and relevant excerpts from constitutions.