A number of recent hypotheses have attempted to explain the ultimate evolutionary origins of laughter and humor. However most of these have lacked breadth in their evolutionary frameworks while neglecting the empirical existence of two distinct types of laughter--Duchenne and non-Duchenne--and the implications of this distinction for the evolution of laughter as a signal. Most of these hypotheses have also been proposed in relative isolation of each other and remain disjointed from the relevant empirical literature. Here we attempt to remedy these shortcomings through a synthesis of previous laughter and humor research followed by (i) a reevaluation of this research in light of theory and data from several relevant disciplines, and (ii) the proposal of a synthetic evolutionary framework that takes into account phylogeny and history as well as proximate mechanisms and adaptive significance. We consider laughter to have been a preadaptation that was gradually elaborated and co-opted through both biological and cultural evolution. We hypothesize that Duchenne laughter became fully ritualized in early hominids between 4 and 2 mya as a medium for playful emotional contagion. This mechanism would have coupled the emotions of small hominid groups and promoted resource-building social play during the fleeting periods of safety and satiation that characterized early bipedal life. We further postulate that a generalized class of nonserious social incongruity would have been a reliable indicator of such safe times and thereby came to be a potent distal elicitor of laughter and playful emotion. This class of stimuli had its origins in primate social play and was the foundation for formal human humor. Within this framework, Duchenne laughter and protohumor were well established in the hominid biobehavioral repertoire when more cognitively sophisticated traits evolved in the hominid line between 2 mya and the present. The prior existence of laughter and humor allowed them to be co-opted for numerous novel functions, and it is from this process that non-Duchenne laughter and the "dark side" of laughter emerged. This perspective organizes the diversified forms and functions that characterize laughter and humor today and clarifies when and how laughter and humor evolved during the course of human evolution.

Recent evidence suggests that psychopathy is a trait continuum. This has unappreciated implications for understanding the selective advantage of psychopathic traits. Although clinical psychopathy is typically construed as a strategy of unconditional defection, subclinical psychopathy may promote strategic conditional defection, broadening the adaptive niche of psychopathy within human societies. To test this, we focus on a ubiquitous real-life source of conditional behaviour: the expected relational value of social partners, both in terms of their quality and the likely quantity of future interactions with them. We allow for conversational interaction among participants prior to their playing an unannounced, one-shot prisoner's dilemma game, which fosters naturalistic interpersonal evaluation and conditional behaviour, while controlling punishment and reputation effects. Individuals scoring higher on factor 1 (callous affect, interpersonal manipulation) of the Levenson self-report psychopathy scale defected conditionally on two kinds of lowvalue partners: those who interrupted them more during the conversation, and those with whom they failed to discover cues to future interaction. Both interaction effects support the hypothesis that subclinical primary psychopathy potentiates defection on those with low expected relational value. These data clarify the function and form of psychopathic traits, while highlighting adaptive variation in human social strategies.

During conversation, interlocutors coordinate their behavior on many levels. Two distinct forms of behavioral coordination have been empirically linked with affiliation and cooperation during or following face-to-face interaction: behavior matching and interpersonal synchrony. Only the latter form constitutes behavioral entrainment involving a coupling between independent oscillators. We present the first study of the association between spontaneously occurring behavioral coordination and postinteraction economic game-play. Triads of same-sexed strangers conversed for 10 min, after which each participant played an unannounced one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) toward each co-participant. When dyads had higher language style matching scores (LSM: Gonzales et al., 2010), the individuals evaluated each other more positively, but they were no more likely to cooperate in the PD. However, when dyads' speech rates (mean syllable duration) converged more strongly from the beginning to the end of the conversation, they were more likely to cooperate in the PD, despite no effect on interpersonal evaluations. Speech rate convergence, a form of rhythmic entrainment, could benefit interlocutors by mutually reducing cognitive processing during interaction.We suggest that spontaneous, temporally-based behavioral coordination might facilitate prosocial behavior when the joint cooperative effort is itself perceived as a form of coordination.

Experimental economic games reveal significant population variation in human social behavior. However, most protocols involve anonymous recipients, limiting their validity to fleeting interactions. Understanding human relationship dynamics will require methods with the virtues of economic games that also tap recipient identity-conditioned heuristics (RICHs). This article describes three RICH economic games-an allocation game, a taking game, and a costly reduction game-that involve monetary decisions across photos of one's social network, integrating recipient identities while maintaining decision confidentiality. I demonstrate the ecological validity of these games in a study of male social relationships in a rural Fijian village. Deciders