We study political influences on private banks receiving government funds. Using spatial discontinuities associated with congressional district borders, we show that recipient banks of the 2008 Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) program increased mortgage and small business lending by 23–60% more in census tracts located just inside their home-representative’s district than just outside; the effect also shows up in higher loan acceptance rates, and mortgages more likely to be impaired or in default. The effect is stronger when the representative voted for TARP, is politically powerful, connected to the financial industry, and when the bank is important in the district. These findings suggest that obtaining public funds subjects firms to political influences, which affects the quantity and quality of corporate investment because of political considerations.

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We gather a new database to conduct the first historically informed study of the importance of liquidity and credit for government bonds between 1880 and 1910. We argue that colonial and sovereign debt markets were segmented owing to differences in underlying information asymmetries. The result was heterogeneous pricing of colonial and sovereign debt, and different market microstructures and clienteles, themselves influenced by political, institutional, and financial arrangements. We find that sovereign spreads mainly reflected credit risks, while colonial spreads mainly reflected liquidity risks. Liquidity premia were economically large and significant, contributing between 10 percent and 39 percent of colonial spreads. These findings help understanding why the seemingly dry subject of colonial illiquidity inspired passionate disputes and ground-breaking reforms of financial imperial institutions.

This paper shows that lending relationships insulate corporate investment from shocks to collateral values. We construct a novel database covering the banking relationships of UK firms, as well as those of their board members and executives. We find that the sensitivity of corporate investment to shocks to real estate collateral value is halved when the length of the bank-firm relationship increases from the 25th to the 75th percentile. This effect is substantially reduced for firms whose executives have a personal mortgage relationship with their firm's bank. Our findings provide support for theories where collateral and private information are substitutes in mitigating credit frictions over the cycle.

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