Th is paper focuses on the transparency of Slovak municipalities. It identifi es the main trends in the transparency of the 100 largest Slovak municipalities between 2010 and 2014. It shows that there are diff erent degrees of transparency in Slovak municipalities, and it applies regressions to explore correlates and identify the main factors behind this state. Th is research is descriptive and explanatory and adds to literature by examining political, structural factors related to the political supply of the transparency of the municipalities and the convergence eff ect. Th e regression analysis identifi es the convergence eff ect, according to which the transparency of municipalities improves inversely to their initial score. It also fi nds a negative incumbency eff ect that indicates lower improvement for incumbent mayors than for new ones. Th e size of a municipality is also one of the factors that determine the transparency level of that municipality. Th is relationship is positive -greater size of a municipality increases the level of its transparency.

The article focuses on the mayoral elections in all cities (138) in Slovakia. This analysis presents how the positions of mayors are distributed between men and women. Specific and detailed electoral data from the 2006 and 2010 mayoral elections allows for presuming whether the current distribution is caused by the electoral preferences of voters (demand) or by the supply of candidates. According to theoretical literature, mayors who are running for second term may have an advantage over their opponents. Data shows us how big this incumbency effect is in Slovak cities.

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PurposeThe objective was to increase earnings of the city of Prievidza from waste disposal fee by proactive communication – reminder (a letter) and leaflets with targeted framing. The quasi-experiment aims to find out which type of leaflet framing (an injunctive social norm or public good) causes the most effective change in the debtors' behaviour.Design/methodology/approachThe article presents the results of a behavioural quasi-experiment, carried out on a local government level. The effectiveness of the intervention was tested in a quasi-experiment with the sample size 712, which is 35% of all waste disposal fee debtors in Prievidza.FindingsThe intervention that has proven to be the most effective was a reminder together with an injunctive social norm leaflet. It resulted in a 1.7 times higher probability for the debt to be paid. The results also indicate that a reminder is significantly more effective if targeted at debtors who only owe one payment–this group was three times more likely to pay their debt after being exposed to the intervention.Practical implicationsPublic policy recommendation is to primarily target the group of debtors who owe one payment.Originality/valueAnother testing and replication of this experiment design is highly important. Nonetheless, the first testing (field quasi-experiment) shows the potential of using the notification as well as social norm framing. It also appears that self-governments should use notifications to primarily address debtors without a long history of non-payment.

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