Law search is fundamental to legal reasoning and its articulation is an important challenge and open problem in the ongoing efforts to investigate legal reasoning as a formal process. This Article formulates a mathematical model that frames the behavioral and cognitive framework of law search as a sequential decision process. The model has two components: first, a model of the legal corpus as a search space and second, a model of the search process (or search strategy) that is compatible with that environment. The search space has the structure of a "multi-network"-an interleaved structure of distinct networks-developed in earlier work. In this Article, we develop and formally describe three related models of the search process. We then implement these models on a subset of the corpus of U.S. Supreme Court opinions and assess their performance against two benchmark prediction tasks. The first is to predict the citations in a document from its semantic content. The second is to predict the search results generated by human users. For both benchmarks, all search models outperform a null model with the learning-based model outperforming the other approaches. Our results indicate that through additional work and refinement, there may be the potential for machine law search to achieve human or near-human levels of performance.

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In the original publication of the article, the first author name has been incorrectly published as Faraz Dadgosari. The correct author name should read as Faraz Dadgostari.

The Judicial Trilemma, by Jeff Dunoff and Mark Pollack, studies the dynamic relations between accountability, transparency, and independence, and suggests that designers can only maximize two of these three values at once. 1 They can create a court that has high levels of (1) independence and accountability, (2) transparency and independence, or (3) accountability and transparency, but only at the cost of having a low level of the third value. The article explores these ideas using four different international tribunals, but its insights are not limited to international courts. Domestic designers also have to decide what levels of accountability, independence, and transparency their courts should have, and in making a decision they will face the Judicial Trilemma and confront the hard choice of selecting primarily two out of three values. This essay will take readers to a world of political judges, faceless tribunals, court purges, and insincere dissents, and explore how the Judicial Trilemma's logic applies in a Latin American context. The Judicial Trilemma helps us understand many features of Latin American courts. However, these courts also expose the limits of the theory and how under different circumstances the Trilemma's responses can become perversely self-defeating.

Legal designers use different mechanisms to entrench constitutions. This article studies one mechanism that has received little attention: constitutional “locks,” or forced waiting periods for amendments. We begin by presenting a global survey, which reveals that locks appear in sixty-seven national constitutions. They vary in length from nine days to six years, and they vary in reach, with some countries “locking” their entire constitution and others locking only select parts. After presenting the survey, we consider rationales for locks. Scholars tend to lump locks with other tools of entrenchment, such as bicameralism and supermajority rule, but we argue that locks have distinct and interesting features. Specifically, we theorize that locks can cool passions better than other entrenchment mechanisms, promote principled deliberation by placing lawmakers behind a veil of ignorance, and protect minority groups by creating space for political bargaining. Legislators cannot work around locks, and because locks are simple and transparent, lawmakers cannot “break” them without drawing attention. For these reasons, we theorize that locks facilitate constitutional credibility and self-enforcement, perhaps better than other entrenchment mechanisms.