This paper focuses on a single question that highlights some of the most puzzling aspects of Kant’s explanation of the duty of moral self-perfection. What kinds of activity count as striving for purity in one’s disposition to duty, or strength of will? I argue that a dominant strand of Kant’s approach to moral striving does not fit familiar models of striving. I seek to address this problem in a way that avoids the flaws of synchronic and atomistic approaches to moral self-discipline by developing an account of Kantian moral striving as an ongoing contemplative activity complexly engaged with multiple forms of self-knowledge.

This paper develops the basis for a new account of radical moral imagination, understood as the transformation of moral understandings through creative response to the sensed inadequacy of one's moral concepts or morally significant appraisals of lived experience. Against Miranda Fricker, I argue that this kind of transition from moral perplexity to increased moral insight is not primarily a matter of the “top‐down” use of concepts. Against Susan Babbitt, I argue that it is not primarily a matter of “bottom‐up” intuitive responsiveness to experience. Beyond courage and hope, radical moral imagination involves the articulation of inchoate experience, which allows individuals to make new kinds of moral moves and to lay claim to others' acknowledgment of the meaning of these moves.

This paper develops an account of moral imagination that identifies the ways in which imaginative capacities contribute to our ability to make reason practical in the world, beyond their roles in moral perception and moral judgment. In section 1, I explain my understanding of what it means to qualify imagination as 'moral,' and go on in section 2 to identify four main conceptions of moral imagination as an aspect of practical reason in philosophical ethics. I briefly situate these alternative ideas in relation to standard accounts of moral perception and judgment with reference to some guiding examples. In section 3, I argue that the fourth conception of moral imagination, moral imagination understood as the capacity to generate new possibilities for morally good action, is not well accounted for within the standard categories of practical reason. Section 4 clarifies the scope and importance of this capacity and defends its claim to increased theoretical attention.The project of explaining how reason can be made practical involves claims about the relationships between knowledge of universals, perception of particulars, emotion, motivation, and judgment. Which components should be included in an account of practical reason, and which, if any, are fundamental are questions potentially complicated by recent claims about the positive roles played by imagination in moral reasoning. Do accounts of 'moral imagination' break any new ground in ethical theory, or do they basically add fringe to familiar frameworks? In response to this question, I argue that framing moral imagination as the capacity to generate new possibilities for both morally required and meritorious actions exposes the limits of

The goal of moral education is moral formation and moral improvement. Kant's duty of moral self-perfection applies to people who have undergone preliminary stages of moral formation and are in the position to strive for moral improvement based on a grasp of principle and an understanding of ends that are also duties. We are familiar with standard shorthand expressions of moral encouragement such as 'Do as much good as you can' or 'Do your best' . Kant himself declares in §21 of the Doctrine of Virtue 'If there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, strive for it' (Kant, 1996, p. 566 [6:446]). I would like to take a closer look at whether these sorts of slogans, especially when abstracted from a richer picture of the content of moral duties, are actually valuable as methods of encouraging moral improvement. Indeed, I will present several reasons to support the claim that we could do better at encouraging people to be better.

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