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Meta-organizations, such as joint ventures and other complex forms of inter-firm organizations, are characterized by the absence of formal authority. This lack of internal hierarchy can lead to severe conflicts between cooperating organizations and hence requires specific governance. This paper recognizes arbitration as an integral part of the organizational architecture of meta-organizations. First, attributes are identified that in the context of meta-organizations distinguish arbitration from ordinary courts. Then these attributes are considered to discuss why arbitration should be understood as an internal rather than an external governance device, delineating the boundaries of meta-organizations, and leading to optimal investment decisions.

In its Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, the European Commission included a new neighbouring right for press publishers with regard to the digital use of their publications ''to ensure quality journalism and citizens' access to information.'' (European Commission, 14 September 2016, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, Doc. COM(2016) 593 final, Art. 11(1) and Recital 31.) Undoubtedly, a free and pluralist press is one of the cornerstones of democratic societies. The question is, however, whether this goal can be achieved by adopting an additional layer of protection. From an economic perspective, it seems essential that publishers, including press publishers, develop new business models in the digital environment. To ensure the survival of quality journalism, it is of utmost importance to support the transition to new business models that has already started in the publishing sector. Hence, the question arises whether the proposal of a new neighbouring right is a legislative initiative that makes sense against this background. To answer this question, the following inquiry will first provide an economic analysis of new business models in the publishing industry. On

The most common pecuniary sanction, i.e. fixed-fines, places an emphasis on the severity of the crime. This fine has the problem of being either too high for poorer offenders to pay or too low for the richer offenders to be deterred. Day-fines, on the other hand, systematically account for the financial situation of the offender as well as for the severity of his offense. Consequently, it imposes equivalent burden of punishment on offenders who committed similar crimes, regardless of their wealth. However, a problem of asymmetric information is raised. Accurate financial information is essential for the efficiency of day-fines, yet its collection is costly. Day-fines receive increasing attention from policy-makers around the world. Nonetheless, it is under-researched in the law and economics literature. Therefore, this article is the first to formally analyze the problem of asymmetric information in the context of day-fines and to develop an optimal secondary enforcement system that would incentivize criminals to provide accurate information regarding their wealth.