We study oligopolistic competition in product markets where the firms' quantity decisions are delegated to managers. Some firms are commonly owned by shareholders such as index funds, whereas the other firms are owned by independent shareholders. Under such an asymmetric ownership structure, the common owners have an incentive to coordinate when designing the manager compensation schemes. This implicit collusion induces a less aggressive output behavior by the coordinated firms and a more aggressive behavior by the noncoordinated firms. The profits of the noncoordinated firms are increasing in the number of coordinated firms. The profits of the coordinated firms exceed the profits without coordination if at least 80% of the firms are commonly owned.

Constantly rising expenditures for pharmaceuticals require government intervention in firms’ pricing decisions. To this end, reference pricing systems are a frequently employed regulatory mechanism. This paper considers a duopoly market with vertically differentiated firms highlighting the effects of a reference pricing system on prices, consumer and producer surplus, expenditures and welfare. Reference pricing decreases equilibrium prices and induces a more competitive environment. It promotes generic usage leading to increased market coverage. Especially generic consumers benefit from a reference pricing regulation. The losses in producer surplus are mainly born by the brand-name firm. Introducing a reference pricing system unambiguously increases welfare.

This paper studies the combined effects of mixed ownership structures and manager delegation on firms’ investment in automation processes in a multi-stage triopoly game. We show that, in accordance with empirical evidence, firms owned by common shareholders invest less in automation and realize lower profits compared to a firm owned by independent shareholders. Direct collusion of owners in terms of coordinated investment increases the profits, the one of the independent firm even more than the profits of the commonly owned firms. Delegation of operational decisions to managers results in higher investment and lower profits. In markets with favorable technological opportunities for automation, common ownership combined with manager delegation leads to the highest social welfare.

No abstract

No abstract