In the actor-centered institutionalist approach of Fritz Scharpf (1997), 'actor constellations' constitute the crucial link between substantive policy analysis and interactionoriented policy research. This paper presents an attempt to conceptualize the 'actor constellation' in a given policy domain and to analyze it empirically with network analysis. The empirical context is provided by the Swiss energy policy elite in the late 1990s -an example of a policy domain in transition between two policy equilibria. Based on interviews with 240 of the core actors in this policy elite, the results show a characteristic antagonism between a pro-ecology and a pro-growth coalition. On the national level, the two coalitions are of comparable size and power, which explains the current impasse in the policy domain in question. Moreover, in a federalist state like Switzerland, the energy policy elite is not concentrated at the center, but the basic antagonism is reproduced in each region nationwide. Confirming the consensus character of Swiss politics, the different components of the two antagonist coalitions not only cooperate within, but also across coalitions. These cooperative ties and the presence of honest brokers, policy enterpreneurs, and heterogeneous interests within each coalition provide opportunities for new alliances, which may lead out of the current impasse in the more or less near future. ConceptualizationWe adopt the perspective of the actor-centered institutionalist approach to policy research proposed by Scharpf (1997). In this perspective 'actor constellations' provide the crucial link between substantive policy analysis and interaction-oriented policy research. According to Scharpf (1997: 69), the basic idea is that the solutions (identified by substantive policy research) to a given policy problem must be produced by the interdependent choices of a plurality of policy actors with specific capabilities and with specific perceptions and preferences regarding the outcomes that could be obtained.In other words, to know the actor constellation is to know the parameters determining the choices among the substantive policy options. As far as the actors are concerned, we agree with Knoke et al. (1996: 7) that the central actors in the democratic political process today are formal organisations, i.e.,

This article explores the paradox of constructive ambiguity. Based on a focused, longitudinal comparison of the European Union's energy and defense policies, we analyze the role played by strategies of ambiguity in European integration. Ambiguity is found to be an attractive strategy for political entrepreneurs when member state preferences are heterogeneous and the EU's legal basis is weak. It is likely to be effective, however, only if it is embedded in an institutional opportunity structure -, that is, a formal-legal context -that entrepreneurs can fold into their strategic repertoire of ideas. While ambiguity can be strategic in circumstances where clarity would create strong opposition, it is not sufficient to entrench a European policy if it does not rest on an institutional basis. This suggests that European political entrepreneurs should be wary of relying on coalition building by ambiguity only. Keywords: European Union, energy policy, defense policy, ideas, Stanley HoffmannThis is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Jegen, Maya, and Frédéric Mérand. 2013 DOI: 10.1080DOI: 10. /01402382.2013. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for This article assesses the role of "constructive ambiguity" in promoting European integration. 1 Henry Kissinger famously defined constructive ambiguity as "the deliberate use of ambiguous language in a sensitive issue in order to advance some political purpose" (Berridge and James 2003). In an early formulation of the argument we explore in this article, Stanley Hoffmann (1995[1966]: 131) wrote: "There has always been most progress when the Europeans were able to preserve a penumbra of ambiguity around their enterprise, so as to keep each one hoping that the final shape would be closest to his own ideal, and to permit broad coalitions to support the next moves." Constructive ambiguity has become a received wisdom among Europeanists, a bit like Henry Kissinger's phone number, Jacques Delors's unidentified political object, Donald Puchala's elephant, or the bicycle that cannot stop. Yet it has not been subject to systematic empirical scrutiny. . « Constructive Ambiguity: Comparing the EU's Energy and Defence Policies ». West European Politics 37(1): 182-203, which has been published in final form 2While the role of ambiguity remains understudied in EU politics, it is enjoying some currency in related fields such as anthropology, public policy, and international relations. For Murray Edelman (2001: 80), " [a]mbiguity (…) is especially conspicuous in political language because by definition politics concerns conflicts of interests." Indeed, ambiguity is often seen as a means to conceal or to postpone conflict. Using the example of the "social responsibility" label in the mutual fund industry, Linda Markowitz and her colleagues (2012) argue that strategic actors frame financial products ambiguously to reduce negative reactions in the market. Looking at "agencification" in public administ...

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In Switzerland like in many other countries, political decision makers face the twofold challenge to adapt current electricity market regulation to achieve di!erent goals at the same time: market liberalisation and sustainable development. The general trend of the liberalisation of the electricity markets implies radical structural changes of the electricity industry as well as of the institutional rules for its regulation. But how can the overall goal of sustainable development be brought in line with the ongoing discussion on market (de)regulation? After re#ecting on the objectives of the liberalisation process, we analyse the political acceptance of di!erent instruments to achieve environmental goals in a liberalised electricity market; the analysis is based on empirical data from an inquiry among 250 key players of Swiss energy policy. We compare these outcomes to theoretical (economic) insights on &"rst-best', &second-best' and &third-best' solutions, and we conclude with a closer look at perspectives for a future energy supply structure in Switzerland.