Amid the global resurgence of nationalist governments, what do we know about nationalism? This review takes stock of political science debates on nationalism to critically assess what we already know and what we still need to know. We begin by synthesizing classic debates and tracing the origins of the current consensus that nations are historically contingent and socially constructed. We then highlight three trends in contemporary nationalism scholarship: ( a) comparative historical research that treats nationalism as a macropolitical force and excavates the relationships between nations, states, constitutive stories, and political conflict; ( b) behavioral research that uses survey data and experiments to gauge the causes and effects of attachment to nations; and ( c) ethnographic scholarship that illuminates the everyday processes and practices that perpetuate national belonging. The penultimate section briefly summarizes relevant insights from philosophy, history, and social psychology and identifies knowledge gaps that political scientists are well-positioned to address. A final section calls for more comparative, cross-disciplinary, cross-regional research on nationalism.

When elections are free and fair, why do some political parties rule for prolonged periods of time? Most explanations for single-party dominance focus on the dominant party's origins, resources, or strategies. In this article, we show how opposition parties can undermine or sustain single-party dominance. Specifically, opposition parties should be central in explaining single-party dominance in countries with highly disproportional electoral systems and a dominant party whose vote share falls short of a popular majority. Employing a quantitative analysis of Indian legislative elections as well as a paired case study, we show that opposition coordination plays a crucial part in undermining single-party dominance.

Divided societies have long been seen as terrible terrain for democracy. Yet some countries in South and Southeast Asia have managed to overcome ethnic and religious rifts and establish lasting democracy, as in India, while other countries in these regions have seen such deep divisions underpin durable authoritarianism, as in Malaysia. We trace these differences to divergent definitions of the nation that prevailed in struggles for independence and that continue to provide a political resource in ongoing political struggles. Where the national community was defined as inclusive in both ethnoreligious and popular terms, democracy has proven stronger. Alternatively, where the foundational national bargain was more exclusive with respect to salient identity cleavages and popular classes, authoritarianism has been reinforced. Founding types of nationalism not only help explain regime types in India and Malaysia but in countries across southern Asia, offering novel insight into how to understand ongoing battles to shape the nation and the people’s political position within it. In an era of rising nationalist fervor and eroding support for democracy, understanding the conditions under which nationalism either promotes democracy or bolsters authoritarianism is of critical importance to political scientists, activists, and policymakers alike.

Does nationalist sentiment support or stymie democracy? And through what mechanisms? As comparative scholars have done little to answer this question, this article draws upon evidence from the Modi government to suggest that the relationship between degree of nationalism and democracy hinges upon a country's dominant type of nationalism. To evidence this theoretical claim, the article develops two empirical arguments: first, that a historically inclusive founding Indian nationalism has been harnessed to protect democratic institutions during political crises and second, that a newly ascendant and exclusive Indian nationalism is legitimating the sidelining of minorities. In doing so, India is embarking upon a path by which established democracies break down.

At the stroke of midnight on August 14 and August 15, 1947, the former independence leaders Mohammed Ali Jinnah and Jawaharlal Nehru respectively presided over the creation of Pakistan and India, two new countries carved out from British India that should have been equally unlikely to become stable democracies. Both countries emerged from nearly a century of shared colonial rule with broadly similar state institutions, both were governed as infant democracies until their sovereign constituent assemblies wrote new constitutions, and both countries were beset by massive refugee crises, though Pakistan's was larger relative to its population. Both ethnically diverse countries were destabilized by external and sub-national challenges to their territorial integrities and both countries were governed by single dominant parties, supported by multi-class coalitions, which had some experience governing at provincial levels prior to independence. Yet, despite such striking similarities, these two countries embarked upon markedly different democratic trajectories immediately upon their twin independences. Pakistan's constitution-making process was from the start mired in confl ict and national elections were perpetually delayed while eight national administrations cycled through power with increasing rapidity. Pakistan's tentative democratic experiment foundered on the shoals of two extra-legal 'bureaucratic coups' in 1953 and 1954 and formally ended with a military coup in 1958. In contrast, India rapidly ratifi ed the world's longest constitution in early 1950, held free and fair national elections on the basis of universal adult suffrage in 1952, and installed an elected chief executive who subordinated the military and civilian bureaucracy. These democratic differences, as indicated in