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This paper makes an argument for the democratic value of distrust. It begins by analyzing distrust, since distrust is not merely the negation of trust. The account that it develops is based primarily on Martin Luther King Jr.'s work in Why We Can't Wait. On this view, distrust is the confident belief that another individual or group of individuals or an institution will not act justly or as justice requires. It is a narrow normative account of distrust, since it concerns a specific normative task. Distinctions between vertical and horizontal distrust, as well as trust and agnostic trust will also be discussed. This paper argues that distrust's democratic value lies in its ability to secure democracy by protecting political minorities from having their voices ignored. As such, distrust can be viewed as a kind of Madisonian "check and balance" that works to prevent tyranny. Distrust also works to secure democracy by forging new or alternative forms of democratic participation. The main example discussed in this paper is King's involvement in the Birmingham Campaign during the Black Civil Rights movement in America. In this case, King and his supporters' distrust of fellow White citizens and political institutions led to alternative forms of political expression such as non-violent protests, boycotts, and other forms of civil disobedience, all of which led to greater racial justice by working to alleviate White tyranny. * I am very grateful for detailed written feedback from two anonymous reviewers and Elizabeth Anderson and for comments from audiences at Western University and the Central APA Symposium on Oppression. 1 For a few recent examples, see the selections in Mark Warren (ed.

Word Count: 10 962 John Rawls bases his support for the moral importance of democracy on a conception of citizens' higher-order interests. On his view, citizens conceive of themselves as having a higher-order interest in the development and exercise of their two moral powers -the capacity for justice and the capacity for a conception of the good.Rawls argues that a secure sense of self-respect is essential for the adequate development and full and informed exercise of the two moral powers, and that equal political liberty and its fair value is needed to ensure a secure a sense of self-respect.Despite the vast literature on Rawls's work, few have discussed his arguments for the value of democracy. When his arguments have been discussed, they have received staunch criticism. Some critics have charged that Rawls's arguments are not deeply democratic. Others have gone further, claiming that Rawls's arguments denigrate democracy.1 These criticisms are unsurprising, since Rawls's arguments, as arguments that the principle of equal basic liberty needs to include democratic liberties, are incomplete. In contrast to his trenchant remarks about core civil liberties, Rawls does not

The main goal of this study is to determine whether women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals relative to their representation in the field of ethics. Our study proceeds in three steps. Step one: we estimate the percentage of women who specialize in ethics. Step two: we estimate the percentage of articles in prestigious ethics journals that are authored by women. Step three: we examine whether there is any difference between the percentage of women who specialize in ethics and the percentage of articles in prestigious ethics journals that are authored by women. We conclude that women are underrepresented in prestigious ethics journals relative to their representation in the field of ethics.

There is a growing body of work illustrating that we can motivate individuals to donate more to charities by nudging them through various behavioral techniques. Yet, there is very little discussion of whether we should motivate individuals by using these types of techniques. In this paper, I explore this under-examined matter. I begin by surveying the various ways in which individuals can be nudged to donate to charity. I then consider whether we should nudge people in these ways. I explore this matter by considering whether nudging interferes with an individual’s autonomy and, if it does, whether this is morally impermissible. I argue that, in some cases, nudging will interfere with an individual’s autonomy. I spell out which cases these are. I then argue that whether interfering with an individual’s autonomy through nudging, as a means of alleviating poverty (and, in turn, promoting human rights), is impermissible will depend on whether we have perfect or imperfect duties to aid the poor. I close by suggesting that, at least for the time being, the moral permissibility of nudging poverty alleviation is indeterminate.