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Although theories of partisanship were developed for the democratic context, partisanship can be important in electoral autocracies as well. We use survey data to analyze partisanship in an electoral autocracy, Turkey, and find that partisanship is pervasive, strong, and consequential. Using the Partisan Identity Scale to measure partisanship, we show that, like in democracies, partisanship strength is associated with political attitudes and action. Unlike in democracies, however, the ruling party’s superior ability to mobilize supporters through clientelistic linkages makes the association between partisanship and political action weaker for ruling party partisans. We find that partisan identities are tightly connected to the perception that other parties may threaten one’s well-being, and that such fears are widespread on both sides of the political divide. We interpret our findings in light of the autocratization process Turkey went through. Our contribution highlights the potential of integrating regime dynamics in studies of partisanship.

This article analyses the Erdoğan government's policy response to the coronavirus pandemic. Despite the abundant use of moral antagonisms in his discourse, Erdoğan did not attempt to politicize the pandemic, instead framing it as a global health crisis and presenting the government's public health policies as expert-driven and competent. However, this expert-driven approach was largely a performance. Without a system of democratic oversight or a free media to scrutinize government policies, the Erdoğan government could systematically undercount COVID-19 cases and disregard its own public health restrictions, all the while spreading its narrative of competence and success. Competitive policymaking by opposition-controlled municipalities and criticism from a strong doctors' association had relatively limited ability to discredit the government. The public opinion data we present reveal broad-based support for the government's COVID policies. Our article highlights how authoritarian institutions allow governments to sustain a gap between performance and actuality, granting their leaders greater possibilities to claim policy success.

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This chapter first describes the main features of contemporary party organizations in Turkey, focusing on five salient topics: a) leaders’ control over parties, b) political patronage and clientelism, c) the organization of mass participation, d) profiles of political elites, and e) party financing. The discussion highlights variation across parties due to different ideologies and organizational legacies. Two questions that motivate many studies of Turkey’s parties are then discussed in greater depth: Why are party leaders so dominant in party organizations? What are the consequences for democracy of leaders’ extensive control over the organizations? The chapter highlights the role of the 1980 military intervention in aggravating leadership domination in centrist parties, and argues that leadership domination contributed to the party system crisis of the late 1990s, as well as to the recent breakdown of democracy. Currently, the authoritarian and presidential institutional framework creates a new environment for political parties and may cause historically unprecedented transformations in party organizations, both positive and negative.