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Please address all the numbered queries on this page which are clearly identified on the proof for your convenience. Thank you for your cooperation _A_434095 1 Do you want to give this section a title, like the others? 2 Do you not want these in the ref. section? Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften edition, later the Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter [and predecessors], 1902-)). References to the Critique of Pure Reason follow the pagination of the first (A) and second (B) editions. Translations are my own (unless noted otherwise), but I have consulted the commonly used English translations. 2 2 Kant distinguishes three aspects of the higher cognitive faculty: understanding, judgement and reason (A130/B169). Since the higher cognitive faculty as such is said to be spontaneous, I will not be concerned with the details of its further tripartite division. However, for reasons that should become clear, my account will focus on the power of judgement. 3 A remark from Kant's lectures on metaphysics makes this explicit: 'The intellectual cognitive faculty rests on spontaneity, or the faculty of determining oneself, for it is independent of sensation' (Metaphysik Mrongovius, 29: 881).

For Kant, the ideal of enlightenment is most fundamentally expressed as a self-developed soundness of judgment. But what does this mean when the judgment at issue is practical, that is, concerns the good to be brought about through action? I argue that the moral context places special demands on the ideal of enlightenment. This is revealed through an interpretation of Kant's prescription for moral pedagogy in the Critique of Practical Reason. The goal of the pedagogy is to cultivate the moral disposition, and the method consists of training in judgment. Unfortunately, Kant seems to wind up somewhere short of this goal, leaving the young person with only an idle wish for a properly cultivated moral disposition. In this paper, I argue that when we address the special issues that arise when the enlightenment ideal is brought to bear on practical judgment-issues that stem from the intrinsic connection between practical judgment and agency-we will see that there is no lacuna in Kant's account.The imitator (in moral matters) is without character; for character consists precisely in originality in the way of thinking [Denkungsart]. He who has character derives his conduct from a source that he has opened by himself.-Kant, Anthropology

We see other worlds in the distance, but gravity forces us to remain on the earth; we can see other perfections in the spirits above us, but our nature forces us to remain human beings. 1 1 The epigraph is a remark from notes Kant inserted into his own copy of Beobachtungen über das Gef ühl des Sch önen und Erhabenen (Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime) sometime after its publication in 1764.

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