Countries around the world have become concerned about their responsibility to protect the environment and resources. In this paper, we established a model of multi-period PSW-DID (weighted propensity score matching- differences-in-differences) to test the effect of China’s audit of natural resource. We found that: (1) local governments had a strategic incentive to reduce pollution, they paid more attention to environmental performance linked to individual promotion than to green innovation and development. (2) Compared with the long-term and complexity of water pollution control, they paid more attention to air pollution treatment. (3) In the long run, the environmental audit was indeed beneficial to the improvement of environmental quality, but the time of taking effect was the second year (one-year lag). (4) In addition, because of the contradiction between the neglect of human capital and the timeliness of environmental supervision, the local government did not show substantial pollution reduction. Therefore, local officials should foster the long-term responsibility consciousness of green innovation and pay more attention to the integration of human capital. The audit of natural resources should establish a long-term mechanism, which could establish a complete accountability system or change off-office audit to interim audit. The construction of audit big data platforms should pay more attention to substantive characteristic data, such as data on population inflow, which is not only a paper score of air pollution. This study can reveal the dilemma of pollution prevention and control in China, urge local governments to promote the rational flow of human resources, improve the innovation level, and achieve substantive pollution control and efficiency enhancement of green development.

To test the driving effect of China’s tax and fee reduction policies on independent innovation, we established a model of Dynamic Spatial Durbin (SDM) and introduced DMSP/OLS night lighting data and Malmquist productivity index for partial differential decomposition. We found that: (1) Affected by the tax and fee reduction policies, the local province tends to increase the level of independent innovation in the short term, while neighboring provinces tend to purchase and rely on foreign technology; (2) In the long term, the tax and fee reduction policies do not significantly increase the level of independent innovation in local and neighboring regions; (3) There is a strategic choice behavior of local government between political promotion incentives and promoting independent innovation; (4) The policy externality of tax reduction and fee reduction has a two-way feedback effect. We conclude that: (1) The spatial agglomeration characteristics of tax and fee reduction policies require the government to fully consider the local innovation and economic foundation, and break the resource endowment of administrative divisions; (2) The spatial feedback feature of the tax and fee reduction policies requires the government to focus on the two-way interaction of independent innovation in the adjacent regions, rather than just one-way assistance, imitation and learning; (3) The spatial lag characteristics of tax and fee reduction policies require the government to establish a accountability system or life-long system for innovative performance evaluation. Moreover, the study fails to provide causality evidence from the spatial agglomeration and spatial time-delay.