This study examines investor response to three events that help define a federal class action securities lawsuit, specifically, the announcement that names an issuer as a defendant in the lawsuit (at the class action filing date), the disclosure or accounting restatement that 'corrects' the information deficiency (at the end of the class period), and the date at which the fraud on the market allegedly begins (at the beginning of the class period). We document a significant and predictable stock price response at each of these three events. Our tests also indicate that the market interprets these events not in isolation but as sequential and conditional events. Investor response differs on the basis of the characteristics of the issuer, the allegations in the complaint, and the outcome of the litigation. These results and the fact that we observe no systematic price momentum in investor response beyond the announcement dates imply that the market is reasonably efficient with respect to information about securities fraud litigation. Our results are robust to alternative definitions and procedures, and are based on a proprietary database that includes almost all federal securities class action lawsuits since 1990.

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The PSLRA's lead plaintiff provision enlisted institutional investors to monitor class counsel in order to curb the agency costs endemic in securities class actions. This article uses a sample of 731 settlements to examine the efficacy of this provision. It finds that, even when controlling for institutional self‐selection of potentially easier or higher‐quality cases, cases with public pension lead plaintiffs have larger recoveries and lower fee requests and fee awards than cases with other lead plaintiff types. The article also finds evidence consistent with the existence of a significant positive externality associated with public pension participation. Over time, fee requests and fee awards have on average declined significantly even in cases without such lead plaintiffs. These findings suggest that public pensions act as more effective monitors of class counsel than traditional plaintiffs and that the lead plaintiff provision has substantially reduced the transactions costs associated with securities class actions.

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