The dual-process model states that utilitarian judgments occur through effortful, rather than automatic, processes. In 3 studies, we built on this model by evaluating how framing effects and religiosity impact utilitarian judgments. Study 1 (N = 120) incorporated a 2 x 2 design in which participants rated the moral permissibility of a utilitarian judgment vignette, which varied in subject frame and decision time. Religiosity scores were recorded. The results indicated that moral permissibility judgments did not differ if made automatically or deliberately, F(1, 116) = 0.33, p = .57, nor were they influenced by subject frame, F(1, 116) = 0.25, p = .62, or religiosity, F(1, 116) = 1.09, p = .30. Study 2 (N = 42) addressed low ecological validity ratings of the vignette in Study 1. By comparing 5 potential utilitarian vignettes, a grocery store vignette was found to be the most ecologically valid, p < .001. Thus, Study 3 (N = 81) was a replication of Study 1 using the new vignette. To better test the dual-process model, half of the participants deliberated for 30 seconds before making a judgment about the moral permissibility of the utilitarian behavior, whereas the other half made the judgment automatically. Despite efforts to invoke effortful deliberation, the results mirrored those of Study 1, p > .05. Taken together, these 3 studies indicated that utilitarian judgments can be endorsed without deliberation, which suggests that the dual-process model needs further scrutiny. Additionally, future research should prioritize ecological validity when relying on vignettes to study moral processes.
