European regulatory networks (ERNs) play a central role in the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of EU policies and have, thus, become objects of investigation in a fast-growing scholarly literature. We identify two shortcomings -one conceptual, one theoretical -in the literature on ERNs: First, we argue that the principal-agent approach, which is conventionally used to conceptualize ERNs, overlooks and even misrepresents central features of ERNs. By introducing and applying the "orchestration" framework to ERNs we demonstrate that it better captures the specific characteristics of ERNs. Secondly, explanations for the choice and design of ERNs have treated functional and power-based accounts as mutually exclusive. We argue instead that explanatory leverage can be gained by combining these two accounts by specifying their respective domains of application. While functional accounts enable us to illuminate why and under what circumstances ERNs are created in the first place (rather than EU agencies or delegation to the Commission), political accounts help us to shed light on variation in the design of ERNs (i.e. why actors opt for rather close or loose network structures). We illustrate the explanatory value-added of such an approach through two brief case studies on EU telecommunications and competition policies.

This contribution analyses EU member state political responses to ECJ challenges. Faced with high consensus requirements at the European level, member states often have to respond unilaterally and explore how to pursue autonomous regulatory goals in 'ECJ-proof' ways.Based on an actor-centered institutionalist framework, member states' domestic responses to one prominent series of ECJ judgments (Laval, Rüffert, Commission vs Luxembourg) are traced empirically. By anticipating potential legal challenges through the European Commission or private parties and building on existing legal precedent, the case studies show that member state governments manage to preserve significant parts of their original legislation while making it ECJ-proof.

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Sozialtourismus' ('social tourism') was selected as the negative German buzzword of the year. Commissioner Reding, in contrast, argued that EU law provides sufficient safeguards against abuse, and member states were themselves at fault: 'As you know, social security is not harmonized at EU level, each and every Member State decide [sic] on its own social security and assistance rules. Each and every Member State also decide [sic] under which conditions it grants access to this or that benefit to non-nationals.' 2 This article seeks to move beyond populist hysteria about 'social tourism' without denying the real challenges that ECJ case law on the free movement of EU citizens, and on their access to social benefits, poses for EU member states. The welfare system serves an important legitimating function for states. The underlying idea of a social contract and welfare services that are either contributory or tax-financed emphasizes the principles of reciprocity and solidarity. This legitimating function explains why the EU's member state

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