Apparent contradiction is common in traditional monotheism, and perhaps especially so in standard Christian theology given central doctrines such as the incarnation and trinity. This Element aims to chart out a very elementary but abstract framework through which such contradictions may be approached. This Element does not attempt to address the many options for thinking about contradictions in the face of logical entailment; it charts only a few salient abstract options.

The recent work of logician Jc Beall marks a paradigm shift within the fields of analytic theology and philosophy of religion. Thanks to Beall’s work, the long held (and generally unquestioned) assumption that theology is governed by (or closed under) the classical account of logic, is no longer free for the assumption. More importantly, by dropping this unquestioned commitment to the classical account, Beall’s work has uncovered natural and well-motivated solutions to some of monotheistic theologies’ most difficult and longstanding problems. That said, much of Beall’s work (and the work of others who have followed his lead) has been paraconsistent, utilizing glut-theoretic (contradictory) models to solve theologies problems. In this essay, my plan is to go paracomplete, with the aim of exploring a yet to be explored solution to the infamous foreknowledge and freedom problem. My solution finds its roots in the recent work Jc Beall and Aaron Cotnoir (‘God of the Gaps’, Analysis, 2017). Specifically, in this essay I will explore a gap-theoretic solution to the foreknowledge and freedom problem; one in which it is neither true nor false that God has foreknowledge. By utilizing Beall’s and Cotnoir’s model — which sees limit claims on God’s omni-properties as either just false or gappy — a natural and well-motivated solution to the foreknowledge and freedom problem emerges. Moreover, by utilizing the Beall-Cotnoir gap-theoretic model, not only is the foreknowledge and freedom problem circumvented, but an interesting and novel account of divine omniscience emerges.

This essay marks the first steps towards a viable glut-theoretic (contradictory) solution to the longstanding foreknowledge and free will dilemma. Specifically, I offer a solution to the dilemma that accommodates omniscience (foreknowledge) and human freedom (as the ability to do otherwise) in a simple, flat-footed way. This goal is accomplished via viewing the theological fatalist argument not as a problem, but as a sound argument: omniscience and human free will are contradictory and by dropping to a weaker underlying account of logical consequence, we can embrace them in their full-throated, robust (though contradictory) interpretations. That said, the primary aim of this paper is one of exploration: how does a subclassical solution to the foreknowledge and free will dilemma stack up in comparison to the traditional solutions on offer in the literature. This essay represents the beginning of such an exploration.

In this essay, I argue that developments in Alvin Plantinga’s evolutionary argument against naturalism—specifically, Thomas Crisp’s argument against a naturalistic metaphysics—have likely undermined the project of science for naturalists who are scientific realists. Scientific theorizing requires the use of abductive reasoning. A central component of abductive reasoning is the use of one’s imagination. However, Crisp’s argument provides us reason to doubt the trustworthiness of our cognitive faculties as it relates to the imaginative abilities necessary for complex abductive reasoning.

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