Disgust seems to play an important role in moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the role of disgust in moral judgment is limited to certain kinds of moral domains (versus many) and/or certain types of disgust (versus many). To clarify these questions, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis ( k = 512; N = 72,443) on relations between trait disgust sensitivity and moral judgment (disgust-immorality association). Main analyses revealed a significant overall mean disgust-immorality association ( r = .23). Additionally, moderator analyses revealed significant specificity in disgust type and moral domain (grounded in Moral Foundations Theory): effects were stronger for (a) sexual disgust compared to pathogen disgust, (b) sanctity moral judgments compared to other domains of moral judgments, and (c) sexual-sanctity associations compared to other disgust type-moral domain pairings.

No abstract

Disgust seems to play an important role in moral judgment. However, it is unclear whether the role of disgust in moral judgment is limited to certain kinds of moral domains (versus many) and/or certain types of disgust (versus many). To clarify these questions, we conducted a multilevel meta-analysis (k = 512; N = 72,443) on relations between trait disgust sensitivity and moral judgment (disgust-immorality association). Main analyses revealed a significant overall mean disgust-immorality association (r = .23). Additionally, moderator analyses revealed significant specificity in disgust type and moral domain (grounded in Moral Foundations Theory): effects were stronger for (a) sexual disgust compared to pathogen disgust, (b) sanctity moral judgments compared to other domains of moral judgments, and (c) sexual-sanctity associations compared to other disgust type-moral domain pairings.

A recurrent observation in the field of moral psychology is that disgust sensitivity is associated with greater moralization of the binding (and particularly sanctity) moral domains. It is generally assumed that these effects are the result of disgust’s role as an emotion that motivates pathogen avoidance (i.e., the pathogen avoidance account), yet alternative disgust-based accounts of moralization, namely those grounded in sexual avoidance (i.e., the promiscuity avoidance account), might also explain these observations. Across two studies (total N = 2,718), involving 10 diverse samples (from Australia, USA, and Brazil), we found that after controlling for the shared variance of pathogen and sexual disgust, only measures of sexual disgust exhibited a positive (and strong) association with the binding moral foundations. These results argue against the pathogen avoidance account of disgust-binding effects and instead support the promiscuity avoidance account. Above all, this work highlights the utility of delineating the dimensionality of disgust to better characterize the different disgust-based motives underlying moral cognition.