In this study we expand the audit fee model introduced by Simunic (1980) and extended by Houston et al. (1999) by adding a third factor, nonlitigation risk, which refers to general business risks and/or opportunities that extend beyond litigation risk or the conduct of the audit (e.g., opportunities for future audit and nonaudit revenues, potential damage to the auditor's reputation from involvement with a client). In an experiment, we ask audit partners and managers to assess various risks and develop an audit plan after reviewing one of four risk-increasing audit scenarios—the discovery of an error, the discovery of a GAAP inconsistency, a client buyout where the audited financial statements are used in the determination of the exchange price, and the loss of a major client customer. We find that, in the error and buyout cases, audit fee increases are explained only by the planned increase in audit investment; in the GAAP inconsistency case, the audit fee increase is explained in part by the planned increase in audit investment, but to a greater extent by residual litigation risk; in the loss of customer case, the audit fee increase is explained by the planned audit investment, residual litigation risk, and nonlitigation risk. These results suggest that business risk is comprised of at least three factors (acceptable audit risk, residual litigation risk, and nonlitigation risk), and that auditors are compensated to act as auditors, provide insurance for investor losses, and bear risks associated with factors that extend beyond the conduct of the audit. We also discuss how nonlitigation risk can clarify the results of previous research and be used in future research.

We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts' price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and development, analysts' stockprice judgments are not statistically different from their judgments when a company applies pooling-of-interest accounting.

SUMMARY Real earnings management (REM) is an increasingly common method of manipulating financial results, yet little research examines auditors' perceptions of and responses to REM. Using the auditor comfort framework (Pentland 1993; Carrington and Catasús 2007), we examine the extent to which REM impacts auditor comfort and how, in the presence of REM, auditors rely on comfort-building strategies in trying to move from a state of discomfort (i.e., fear of failing to identify misstatements) to comfort. Based on in-depth interviews of 20 experienced auditors, we find that auditors are aware of REM and often identify REM through formalized protocols that include analytical procedures, discussions with management, or their knowledge of the business. Formal audit procedures play a role when trying to address, “rationally,” the risk of REM, but we also find that auditors use emotive phrases and references to body senses related to discomfort, indicating that there also is an emotional component to dealing with REM (Guénin-Paracini, Malsch, and Marché-Paillé 2014). Most of the interviewees have concerns about REM (i.e., it threatens comfort), largely because they believe that it is indicative of management's desire to meet short-term targets (i.e., poor management tone), and that it may signal the use of other, less acceptable earnings management methods (i.e., accruals-based earnings management) to meet those targets. Interviewees respond to the discomfort caused by REM in many ways, including engaging in discussions with the client, increasing skepticism, and altering audit procedures and risk assessments. Auditors may even go as far as resigning from an engagement because of REM. Our analysis reveals that REM is a significant source of auditor discomfort and that auditors use both their rationality and their emotions/body senses to identify and try to alleviate that discomfort.

No abstract

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.