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The basic assumption of this paper is that mathematics and history of mathematics are both forms of knowledge and, therefore, represent different ways of knowing. This was also the basic assumption of Fried (2001) who maintained that these ways of knowing imply different conceptual and methodological commitments, which, in turn, lead to a conflict between the commitments of mathematics education and history of mathematics. But that conclusion was far too peremptory. The present paper, by contrast, takes the position, relying in part on Saussurean semiotics, that the historian's and working mathematician's ways of knowing are complementary. Recognizing this fact, it is argued, brings us to a deeper understanding of ourselves as creatures that do mathematics. This understanding, which is a kind of mathematical self-knowledge, is then proposed as an alternative commitment for mathematics education. In light of that commitment, history of mathematics assumes an essential role in mathematics education both as a subject and as a mediator between the aforementioned ways of knowing.

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