In this paper we argue for the introduction of lotteries as a decision-making procedure for the creation of policy in modern democracies. Our suggestions are focused on the political system of the European Union. We start our line of argument by bringing to readers' attention the recent renaissance of the lottery in democratic practices and political theory. Next we follow the rich body of literature on policy-making in the European Union and identify three aspects of the European political system which are normatively problematic. In the last sections of the paper, we suggest dealing with these problems by the implementation of a system of decision-by-lot. Our reform agenda includes: (1) a weighted lottery in order to distribute a reduced number of positions within the European Commission among the European Union member states;(2) the drawing of lots for the members, the chairpersons and the rapporteurs of the European Parliament's committees; and finally (3) the introduction of a second chamber of the European Parliament whose members would be chosen by lottery among all European Union citizens.

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General entrenchment clauses' are constitutional provisions that make amendments to certain parts of a constitution either more difficult to achieve than 'normal' amendments or even impossible, i.e., legally inadmissible. This article examines the origins of these clauses during the American Revolution (1776-77), their migration to the 'Old World', and their dissemination and differentiation on the European continent from 1776 until the end of 2015. In particular, the article answers three questions: (1) When, and in which contexts, did general constitutional entrenchment clauses emerge? (2) How have they migrated to and disseminated in Europe? (3) Which constitutional subjects do such clauses protect, and thus, which main functions do they aim to fulfil?

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