No abstract

This paper reads Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse-Five and Piercy’s Woman on the Edge of Time as stories of deictic temporal crises. It critically examines the texts, exploring their representations of mental time travel (MTT), and places them into dialectic with health sciences research on autonoesis and episodic memory deficits in people with lived experience of mental health disorders, particularly psychosis or ‘schizophrenia’. The paper uses this dialectic to interrogate how atypical MTT is diagnostically and clinically rendered as pathological, and indicative of psychosis in particular. Similarly, it mines these fictional representations for the insights they might provide in attempting to understand the phenomenological reality of temporal disruptions for people with lived experience of psychosis. The paper moves on to incorporate first-person accounts from people with lived experience, and uses these to refine a Deleuzean static synthesis of time constructed around the traumatic Event and the Dedekind ‘cut’. The paper concludes with some suggestions as to how the literary texts offer possible insights into the experience of people living with ‘psychotic’ temporal disruptions, and in particular how to re-invest their deictic relations to establish functioning fixity and stability of the self in time.

Forrester’s proposed seventh style of reasoning – thinking in cases – functions as an analogous, dyadic relationship that, whilst indebted philosophically to the logical reasoning and semiotics of Charles Peirce, is prone to creating feedback loops between induction and deduction, precluding novel abductive hypotheses from advancing medical knowledge. Reasoning with a Peircean triadic model opens up the contexts and methods of meaning-making and reasoning through medical cases, and the potent influence of their genre conventions, to intellectual critical scrutiny. Vitally, it offers a third mode – abduction – that this article argues needs to be reintroduced into Forrester’s model of reasoning with cases. This article demonstrates this by applying a Peircean triadic model of reasoning to Forrester’s own model, tracing a shared genealogy but one in which the abductive element was lost. The article goes on to illustrate the explanatory and predictive potential of Peircean abductive reasoning and the necessary re-theorising of the case this entails. This argument is supported through an analysis of early case reports of what would become HIV/Aids, drawn from the Case Records of Massachusetts General Hospital series in the New England Journal of Medicine.

The American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) has been partitioning mental illnesses into discrete disease entities for over 60 years. The diagnostic class of schizophrenia has undergone several different labels and some profound changes to its criteria over all these iterations. In trying to develop the least‐imperfect pragmatic description, the DSM has had to make several assumptions about the disease, and over the various iterations several critics – from within and without psychiatry – have increasingly felt that the APA have accepted their own assumptions as truth, creating a self‐justifying and self‐perpetuating ideology of schizophrenia. The latest edition, DSM‐5, has incorporated some of this criticism, but it is unclear whether the dominant ideology of the diagnostic labels will be over‐turned or will simply incorporate this challenge to its authority into its own “continuity myth” of ever‐improving diagnostic criteria.