Decision theory proposes that humans and animals decide what to do in a given situation by assessing the relative value of each possible response. This assessment can be computed, in part, from the probability that each action will result in a gain and the magnitude of the gain expected. Here we show that the gain (or reward) a monkey can expect to realize from an eye-movement response modulates the activity of neurons in the lateral intraparietal area, an area of primate cortex that is thought to transform visual signals into eye-movement commands. We also show that the activity of these neurons is sensitive to the probability that a particular response will result in a gain. When animals can choose freely between two alternative responses, the choices subjects make and neuronal activation in this area are both correlated with the relative amount of gain that the animal can expect from each response. Our data indicate that a decision-theoretic model may provide a powerful new framework for studying the neural processes that intervene between sensation and action.

Cognition presents evolutionary research with one of its greatest challenges. Cognitive evolution has been explained at the proximate level by shifts in absolute and relative brain volume and at the ultimate level by differences in social and dietary complexity. However, no study has integrated the experimental and phylogenetic approach at the scale required to rigorously test these explanations. Instead, previous research has largely relied on various measures of brain size as proxies for cognitive abilities. We experimentally evaluated these major evolutionary explanations by quantitatively comparing the cognitive performance of 567 individuals representing 36 species on two problem-solving tasks measuring self-control. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that absolute brain volume best predicted performance across species and accounted for considerably more variance than brain volume controlling for body mass. This result corroborates recent advances in evolutionary neurobiology and illustrates the cognitive consequences of cortical reorganization through increases in brain volume. Within primates, dietary breadth but not social group size was a strong predictor of species differences in self-control. Our results implicate robust evolutionary relationships between dietary breadth, absolute brain volume, and self-control. These findings provide a significant first step toward quantifying the primate cognitive phenome and explaining the process of cognitive evolution.psychology | behavior | comparative methods | inhibitory control | executive function S ince Darwin, understanding the evolution of cognition has been widely regarded as one of the greatest challenges for evolutionary research (1). Although researchers have identified surprising cognitive flexibility in a range of species (2-40) and potentially derived features of human psychology (41-61), we know much less about the major forces shaping cognitive evolution (62-71). With the notable exception of Bitterman's landmark studies conducted several decades ago (63, 72-74), most research comparing cognition across species has been limited to small taxonomic samples (70, 75). With limited comparable experimental data on how cognition varies across species, previous research has largely relied on proxies for cognition (e.g., brain size) or metaanalyses when testing hypotheses about cognitive evolution (76-92). The lack of cognitive data collected with similar methods across large samples of species precludes meaningful species comparisons that can reveal the major forces shaping cognitive evolution across species, including humans (48,70,89,(93)(94)(95)(96)(97)(98). SignificanceAlthough scientists have identified surprising cognitive flexibility in animals and potentially unique features of human psychology, we know less about the selective forces that favor cognitive evolution, or the proximate biological mechanisms underlying this process. We tested 36 species in two problemsolving tasks measuring self-control and evaluated the leading hypotheses regarding how ...

People often prefer the known over the unknown, sometimes sacrificing potential rewards for the sake of surety. Overcoming impulsive preferences for certainty in order to exploit uncertain but potentially lucrative options may require specialized neural mechanisms. Here, we demonstrate by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) that individuals' preferences for risk (uncertainty with known probabilities) and ambiguity (uncertainty with unknown probabilities) predict brain activation associated with decision making. Activation within the lateral prefrontal cortex was predicted by ambiguity preference and was also negatively correlated with an independent clinical measure of behavioral impulsiveness, suggesting that this region implements contextual analysis and inhibits impulsive responses. In contrast, activation of the posterior parietal cortex was predicted by risk preference. Together, this novel double dissociation indicates that decision making under ambiguity does not represent a special, more complex case of risky decision making; instead, these two forms of uncertainty are supported by distinct mechanisms.