Using survey data from 450 ridehail drivers, this article examines how social networking sites (SNS) influence workers' views on union instrumentality and unionization. This article finds that more frequent interaction with other workers in online communities is associated with improved views of union instrumentality and interest in joining a ridehail drivers' association. These findings link together the fields of information sciences and industrial relations and suggest a new institutional actor in modern industrial systems, the online worker network.

Customer abuse of frontline service workers is widespread. Yet despite growing recognition of this problem, we know very little about the role that service companies play in potentially enabling customers’ abusive behaviors. This phenomenon deserves attention because one of the recent trends in service management is giving customers a direct role in managing and evaluating workers’ performance. In this article, the author explores how granting customers direct access to organizational power over workers, what the author develops conceptually as “laundering control through customers,” explains how customer abuse emerges. Drawing on a sample of 486 Uber and Lyft drivers, the author examines how the companies’ use of the “five-star” evaluation system enables customers to engage in a range of different forms of abuse and how workers resist this configuration of control. This study contributes to the customer triangle literature by bringing in evidence from the gig economy and uncovers new implications for the “dark side” of customer service work.

There is a growing debate about the nature and extent of platform control over workers. Companies claim they are merely ‘matchmakers’ while labour advocates argue that these organisations exercise granular control over workers. Blending the fields of information science and labour relations, this article develops a classification system of sequential control to delineate between ‘high control’ and ‘low control’ platforms. In doing so, this article provides a theoretical method to distinguish ‘sharing’ versus ‘gig’ platforms and argues that worker autonomy—how platforms foreclose worker choice—can be used to understand platform control.

For decades, direct employment relationships have been increasingly displaced by indirect employment relationships through networks of firms and layers of managerial control. The firm strategies driving these changes are organizational, geographic, and technological in nature and are facilitated by state policies. The resulting weakening of traditional forms of collective bargaining and worker power have led workers to counter by organizing broader alliances and complementing structural and associational power with symbolic power and state-oriented strategies through what the authors term “network bargaining.” These dynamics point to the limitations of dominant theories and frameworks for understanding employment relations and suggest a new approach that focuses on a range of direct and indirect work relationships, evolving forms of worker power, and networked patterns of worker–employer interactions.

How and why do platform workers ‘quit’? Drawing on original qualitative data from 84 ride‐hail drivers, the author finds that platform companies use information asymmetries to downplay the true cost of working a ‘gig’. Once workers realize these costs, some exit, yet others cannot because they have come to rely on their ride‐hail income to meet their short‐term needs, a phenomenon the author refers to as ‘acquired dependence’. In response, the author finds these workers begin their own ‘pirate’ (illegal) taxi operations to decrease their dependence on platform companies. These findings are then used to develop an original survey instrument that tests if drivers’ ‘acquired dependence’ is associated with ‘pirate’ taxi operations. Using survey data from 330 ride‐hail drivers, the author finds evidence that drivers with greater acquired dependence are more likely to develop off‐app ‘pirate’ taxi operations. In doing so, this article develops both a new category of conflict and response for marketized employment relationships.