Although the sociology of science is no longer merely one branch of functional analysis, much of the sociological literature on the scientific community remains true to its functionalist origins in stressing the importance of the normative structure of science and in paying little attention to ideology.In the discussion which follows I shall try to show that these two themes can be profitably combined. I shall argue, first of all, that what has been regarded as the normative structure of science can better be viewed as an ideology. I shall then try to show why this ideology, rather than other available alternatives, was developed and used by scientists.The supposed norms of science z For many years, the scientific research community within the modern Western academic setting was depicted by sociologists as being predominantly openminded, impartial and objective. These features, it was claimed, although they were not unique to the scientific community, were present there to a degree unrealised in other fields of intellectual endeavour. This supposed fact could not be explained in terms of the special characteristics of scientists as individuals, because it was recognised that the motives, interests and qualities of individual scientists were quite diverse and by no means always in accord with the special attributes of their professional community. It seemed preferable, therefore, to regard these attributes as characteristics of the community as such, that is, as norms which defined the social expectations to which scientists were generally obliged to conform in the course of their professional activities 1.As a result of this line of reasoning, a long list of putative norms or normative principles has been developed, among which the most important are * I wish to thank Nigel Gilbert of the Department of Sociology, University of York, for his helpful comments on the first draft of this paper.

Legislation designed to control the conduct of research on human embryos was introduced in Britain in 1990. During the preceding debate, there had been widespread public discussion concerning the rights and wrongs of such research. This study examines some of the rhetorical resources used in the final parliamentary debate to support and oppose the continuation of embryo research. Two distinctive rhetorics employed in the dispute are described and documented. They are shown to have been associated with divergent conceptions of the membership of the human community and of the moral boundary within which embryo research should be required to operate. Suggestions are offered regarding the cultural preservation of the critical rhetoric of science, the influence of the two rhetorics upon the legislative outcome of parliamentary debate, and the relevance of these rhetorics to future reappraisals of the limits of scientific research.

A general account is presented of the emergence, growth, and decline of scientific research networks and their associated problem areas. Research networks are seen to pass through three phases. The first, exploratory phase is distinguished by a lack of effective communication among participants and by the pursuit of imprecisely defined problems. The second phase is one of rapid growth, associated with increasing social and intellectual integration, made possible by improved communication. An increasingly precise scientific consensus gradually emerges from a process of negotiation, in which those participants who are members of the scientific elite exert most influence. But as consensus is achieved the problem area becomes less scientifically fruitful; and as the network grows, career opportunities diminish. Consequently, the third, final phase is one of decline and disbandment of the network, together with the movement of participants to new areas of scientific opportunity.

No abstract

At its inception, the sociology of science was centrally concerned with relations between the scientific community and scientific knowledge on the one hand, and the wider society on the other hand. This was true, for instance of Merton's early work on the emergence of modern sciencel and on the norms governing scientific research.2 It was also true of Barber's attempt to provide a first systematic overview of the field.3 3 Recently, however, there has been a growing concentration upon the internal characteristics of the research community, and particularly on the academic research community, with the wider social setting taken as given and relatively unproblematic.4 Those responsible for these more narrowly focused studies have not been unaware that the research community is subject to external influences. But they have assumed that, at least in some modem societies, it has sufficient autonomy to make a separate analysis of its internal processes acceptable as a first approximation.This research strategy has proved to be fruitful. It has enabled researchers to isolate a series of manageable problems and has produced results which have significantly improved our understanding of scientific communication,s the reward system of science,6 6 social control in science,7 the development of research areas,8 and so on.However, this approach has had the unfortunate consequence of drawing attention away from the possibility of extending the analysis of the research community in such a way that connections with the