In this paper we examine how multinational …rms with varied levels of total factor productivity (TFP) self-select into di¤erent host countries. Using a dataset that records the subsidiaries of French manufacturing multinationals, we …nd that …rm-level TFP plays an important role in explaining the sorting of French …rms across host countries. Both the aggregate-and …rm-level estimates suggest that more productive French …rms are consistently more likely than their less e¢ cient domestic competitors to invest in relatively tough host countries. In particular, countries with a smaller market potential, higher …xed costs of investment or lower import tari¤s tend to have higher cuto¤ productivities and attract a greater proportion of productive multinationals. This self-selection mechanism remains largely robust when we control for unobserved …rm and country heterogeneity and address the potential endogeneity of TFP.

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Many nations have undergone significant trade liberalization in the last twenty years even as they have increased their use of contingent protection measures. This raises the question of whether some of the trade liberalization efforts, at times accomplished through painful reforms, have been undone through a substitution from tariffs to nontariff barriers. Among the new forms of protection, antidumping is the most relevant, as its use has spread from few developed countries to a large set of developing countries that are now among the most intense users of this instrument. This paper uses a newly developed database to examine to what extent the use of antidumping in a large set of countries is systematically influenced by the reduction of applied sectoral tariffs. The data set includes information on 29 developing and 7 developed countries from 1991 through 2002. After controlling for time-varying sectoral information as well as macroeconomic conditions, we find evidence of a substitution effect only for heavy users of antidumping among developing countries. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in sectoral trade liberalization increases the probability of observing an antidumping initiation by 32 percent. There is no similar statistically significant result for other developing countries or developed countries. We also find robust evidence of retaliation and deflection effects as determinant of antidumping filings across all subsamples.

This research analyzes the International Trade Commission's anti-dumping decisionsfram 1980 to 1986. The results suggest that commissioners use criteria consistent with the instructions set forth in U.S. legislation. The analysis also indicates that political variables help predict commissioner decisions. Petitions involving Senate oversight committee members' constituencies may be systematically favored in the process.Evidence of possible bias toward less-developed-count y exports is presented as well.The methodology also yields estimates of commissioner-specific fixed eflects.2. For further discussion of these and other political economy models, see Baldwin [1985], Hillman [1989], Moore [1990] and Ode11 and Willett [1990].

Some supporters of antidumping have argued that this procedure serves as a kind of "safety valve" for protectionist pressure. This paper examines whether there is any empirical evidence that the use of antidumping actions has contributed to tariff reductions in a sample of 35 developing and developed countries. There is very little evidence that such a relationship might exist among the 27 developing countries in the sample. We do find some weak but inconsistent evidence for antidumping helping liberalization efforts in the experience of developed countries, which have been the traditional users of antidumping.