We consider supplier development within a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single supplier. Because supplier development usually requires relationshipspecific investments, firms need to protect themselves against partner opportunism. Even though contracts are viewed as the primary formal means of safeguarding transactions, they also entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, particular in a dynamic and uncertain business environment. Thus, we propose a receding horizon control scheme to mitigate possible contractual hazards while significantly increasing the overall supply chain profit. Our findings are illustrated by a numerical example.
We consider supplier development within a supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single supplier. Because investments in supplier development are usually relationship-specific, safeguard mechanisms against the hazards of partner opportunism have to be installed. Here, formal contracts are considered as the primary measure to safeguard investments. However, formal contracts entail certain risks, e.g., a lack of flexibility, particular in an ambiguous environment. We propose a receding horizon control scheme to mitigate possible contractual drawbacks while significantly enhancing the supplier development process and, thus, to increase the overall supply chain profit. Our findings are validated by a numerical case study.
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