I propose a framework, derived from moral theory, for assessing the moral status of intelligent machines. Using this framework, I claim that some current and foreseeable intelligent machines have approximately as much moral status as plants, trees, and other environmental entities. This claim raises the question: what obligations could a moral agent (e.g., a normal adult human) have toward an intelligent machine? I propose that the threshold for any moral obligation should be the "functional morality" of Wallach and Allen [20], while the upper limit of our obligations should not exceed the upper limit of our obligations toward plants, trees, and other environmental entities.

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There may be a limit on our capacity to suppress anthropocentric tendencies toward non-human others. Normally, we do not reach this limit in our dealings with animals, the environment, etc. Thus, continued striving to overcome anthropocentrism when confronted with these non-human others may be justified. Anticipation of super artificial intelligence may force us to face this limit, denying us the ability to free ourselves completely of anthropocentrism.This could be for our own good.

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Assigning the development of a poker-playing agent as a group project allows flexibility with respect to the topics and techniques typically covered in an introductory Artificial Intelligence course. A poker agent project also provides students the experience of 'authentic' AI research, due to the status of poker as an 'unsolved' problem in AI. Despite this status, a poker agent project is feasible for a semester, half-semester, or quarter-long group project. Problems in assigning group projects are also considered, as are suggestions for mitigating these problems.