Based on unique field work in southern Somalia, this article explores how the interrelationship between jihadi insurgent rulers and traditional authority structures fostered local order in the southernmost part of Somalia in the period 2008 to 2012. While the Jihadi insurgent group al-Shabaab's state project was profoundly inspired by jihadi-Salafi ideology when it conquered large parts of South-Central Somalia in 2008-2009, it developed a strategy to cooperate with and co-opt local authority structures. This was partly a pragmatic approach in order to gain control of local institutions and populations. However, utilizing the local clan elders was a practical and cost-effective arrangement through which al-Shabaab could collect material resources, such as money, weapons, new recruits and other local resources. By sustaining the traditional authority structures, al-Shabaab also fostered a degree of trust and legitimacy from the local populations.

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen, usually referred to as al-Shabaab (the youth), is known primarily as a Somali terrorist group. But since the end of 2008, it has functioned as a state power in large parts of Southern and Central Somalia. In this article, I analyze the main legal body of the group: the qāḍ ı̄court. In order to establish law and order in their territories, al-Shabaab has applied their own version of sharı'a. The article reveals that al-Shabaab's application of criminal law follows the inherent logic of classical Islamic legal doctrines on several points. However, the al-Shabaab courts tend to overlook many of the strict requirements regarding evidence and procedure that were outlined by the medieval Muslim scholars in order to humanize Islamic law. Therefore, the legal reality of al-Shabaab's regime is far more brutal than that of most other Islamic-inspired regimes in the contemporary Muslim world. Al-Shabaab's practice of Islamic criminal law may be seen not only as a means to exercise control through fear but also as an effective way of lling the vacuum of insecurity and instability that has followed twenty years of violence and the absence of state institutions in its territories. I argue that, in order to understand al-Shabaab's current practice of criminal law, one has to take into consideration the group's jihadi-Sala aflia-tion. According to Sala notions, sharı'a is not only a means to an end, but an end in itself. As such, sharı'a (i.e., God's divine law) is the visual symbol of an Islamic state. Consequently, the application of Islamic criminal law, and especially of the ḥ udūd punishments, provides al-Shabaab with political-religious legitimacy.

Over the course of only a few months in 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated the clan-based faction leaders in Mogadishu and conquered most parts of South-Central Somalia, an achievement unprecedented since the fall of the Somali state in 1991. The ICU's rapid expansion met with little resistance and the local populations generally received their forces with enthusiasm. Drawing on unique empirical material, the paper discusses why and how the ICU alliance expanded in Somalia's southernmost province Lower Jubba. While ICU's initial success in Mogadishu was due to a combination of several factors, discussed in existing literature, this paper contents that its wider expansion in Lower Jubba was largely caused by ICU's ability to utilize local dynamics, structured along clan lines. While the ICU was initially welcomed by the local population in Lower Jubba, its Islamist inspired politics was soon heavily challenged throughout the province.

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This article explores civilian agency and civil resistance under Islamist insurgents' rule in southern Somalia in the period 2006 to 2012. After almost two decades of civil war, local institutions were weakened and the communities could not resist tight Islamist control. The traditional authorities either fled or chose to cooperate with the new rulers. However, while treading a fine line, traditional authorities were still able to raise community concerns and influence the Islamist rulers' behaviour through limited forms of civil resistance. Although not changing the overall political situation, traditional authorities were instrumental in reducing tension and improving civilian life.