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Upper-class directors of major industrial companies are directors of more corporations than are the non-upper-class directors, but they are less likely to serve on executive committees of corporate boards. This may indicate that there is a class-based division of labor in which the upper-class directors are more concerned with inter-organizational relationships and with the functioning of the economy as a whole, and that non-upper-class directors are concerned with day-to-day operations of individual companies. DOMHOFF (1967:38-62) SUGGESTS that the upper class has an interest in the functioning of the economy as a whole, and argues that the economy's largest firms are controlled by members of the upper class. Although members of the upper class do not hold all positions in top management and on boards of directors, Domhoff argues that there are enough upper-class directors to indicate that the upper class can exercise veto control over major corporate decisions; apparently the relatively minor decisions tend to be relegated to the non-upper-class directors and managers. But is there such a division of labor within this corporate elite? Data on upper-class overrepresentation on boards of directors do not warrant inferences about the differentiation of decision making between upper-class and non-upper-class directors. This paper will report some evidence on differentiation of activity within the corporate elite. This evidence, which indicates that upper-class directors concentrate on interorganizational affairs, tends to support Domhoff's contention that the upper class has a broad, system-level interest in the economy.To support the thesis of upper-class control of the economy, Domhoff reviewed evidence on the concentration of wealth and of stockholding, and his own work on uper-class representation in the power elite. Domhoff and his students ascertained the social class of directors of the largest 20 industrials, 15 banks, and 15 insurance companies. They found that, overall, 53 percent of the 884 directors were members of the upper class. For the-20 largest industrials, in which only outside directors and board chairmen were studied, the proportion listed in the Social Register was onethird, and 54 percent of the directors were members of the upper class. Outside directors of industrials "...sat on an average of six to seven other boards (1967:55)." Domhoff considers the boards decisive because "they make major decisions, such as those of investment, and select the men who will carry out daily operations

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