This study focuses on three broad Finance organization roles: reporting, compliance, and internal control/risk management (RCCR); performance management; and strategic partner. Using data from a global survey of 832 firms, we examine the determinants of the various roles' importance and their relation with Finance effectiveness. While the effects of organizational change, market growth, international operations, firm size, decentralization, and industry on Finance responsibilities vary depending upon the role, we find little evidence of tradeoffs between the various roles. Instead, we find evidence of complementarities between roles, whereby greater emphasis on one role is associated with greater Finance effectiveness in the other roles. Additionally, we find that information system integration (ISI) not only has a positive direct impact on effectiveness in all three roles, but also interacts with the importance placed on RCCR and performance management roles to improve the Finance organization's effectiveness at carrying out these responsibilities.

We examine how suppliers' product market competition influences the relation between customer concentration and cost structure. Analyzing cost data from a sample of manufacturing firms, we find that suppliers exhibit more rigid cost structure when both product market competition and customer concentration are high. In further analysis, we find that the effect of competition on the relationship between customer concentration and cost structure is isolated to the COGS and COGM. Our results suggest that suppliers trade off the downside risk of having fixed costs that cannot be reassigned with the potential upside benefit of meeting major customer demands.

We examine the effect of peer honesty on focal manager honesty in a budget reporting setting. We disclose peer honesty to the focal manager at three levels: no, partial, and full disclosure of the reporting behavior of the other managers in the focal managers' cohort. In partial disclosure, only the reports of the least honest peers are disclosed to the focal manager. In full disclosure, all managers' reports in the cohort are disclosed to the focal manager. We predict and find that disclosure of other managers' reports leads to less honesty compared to the absence of disclosure. We show that disclosure changes the focal manager's perceptions of what constitutes acceptable reporting behavior, such that reporting more dishonestly becomes more acceptable. Our results have implications for understanding fraud dynamics and have practical implications for the design of control systems, as they suggest that managers will use peer dishonesty to justify their own dishonesty, even when they know that only some of their peers report dishonestly.

Improved production processes, particularly miniaturization, have led to the development and use of nonreworkable items subject to failure in modern production environments. Coordinating supply chains for these items requires cooperation between suppliers and buyers in order to balance ordering/setup and holding costs among system partners. In this paper, we first determine optimal inventory policies for both the supplier and buyer. We then apply the bisection method to develop a mechanism which uses a common replenishment time to coordinate a supply chain consisting of a single supplier and n buyers. By utilizing this optimization framework, we minimize total system-wide costs and derive the cost savings associated with our coordinated solution. Numerical examples are then provided for illustration.