The paper begins by asking why there is a market for counterfeit medicines, which in effect creates the problem of counterfeiting itself. Contributing factors include supply chain complexity and the lack of whole-systems thinking. These two underpin the author's view that counterfeiting is a complex (i.e. wicked) problem, and that corporate, public policy and regulatory actions need to be mindful of how their actions may be causal. The paper offers a problem-based review of key components of this complexity, viz., the knowledge end-users/consumers have of medicines; whether restrictive information policies may hamper information provision to patients; the internet's direct access to consumers; internet-enabled distribution of unsafe and counterfeit medicines; whether the internet is a parallel and competitive supply chain to legitimate routes; organised crime as an emerging medicines manufacturer and supplier and whether substandard medicines is really the bigger problem. Solutions respect the perceived complexity of the supply chain challenges. The paper identifies the need to avoid technologically-driven solutions, calling for 'technological agnosticism'. Both regulation and public policy need to reflect the dynamic nature of the problem and avoid creating perverse incentives; it may be, for instance, that medicines pricing and reimbursement policies, which affect consumer/patient access may act as market signals to counterfeiters, since this creates a cash market in cheaper drugs.

On 10 February 1947, A.C. Buehler, the president of the Victor Adding Machine Company presented Norden Bombsight #4120 to the Smithsonian Institute. This sight was in service on board the Enola Gay when it dropped the first atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Through this public presentation, Buehler forever linked his company to the Norden Bombsight, the Enola Gay, and to history. Buehler’s ultimate goal, however, was the sale of adding machines, and while significant, the presentation to the Smithsonian was essentially the final step in a long running advertising campaign designed to sell adding machines. During the War, Victor was the Army’s main contractor for the production of Norden Bombsights. This work is an investigation into the dysfunctional relationship that existed between Victor Adding Machine Company, the Army, the Navy Bureau of Ordinance (BuOrd). Wartime shortages demanded that pre-war arrangements between the Army and BuOrd be reconsidered and it was agreed that the Army be allowed to build its own units. Within a year of production Victor sights were scrutinized for their inaccuracies, and ultimately Victor’s contract was cancelled ending the Army’s short sojourn into bombsight production.

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