We provide evidence that transactions accounts help financial intermediaries monitor borrowers by offering lenders a continuous stream of data on borrowers' account balances. This information is most readily available to commercial banks, but other intermediaries, such as finance companies, also have access to such information at a cost. Using a unique set of data that includes monthly and annual information on small-business borrowers at an anonymous Canadian bank, we find a significant relationship between loans becoming troubled and the number of prior borrowings in excess of collateral. Since the bank monitors the value of collateral (defined as accounts receivable plus inventory) at high frequency through the transactions account of the borrower, this unique access to useful information gives banks an advantage over other lenders. We also find that banks more intensively monitor loans that have a higher number of violations of the collateral limit.

We thank Mitchell Berlin, Martine Durez-Demal, Joanna Stavins, and seminar participants at Temple University, American University, the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, and the meeting of the Financial Structure and Regulation System Committee of the Federal Reserve System for helpful comments. We thank Denise Duffy and Victoria Geyfman for excellent research assistance. And we thank the management of the bank under study for their help. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia or of the Federal Reserve System.

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We provide evidence that transactions accounts help financial intermediaries monitor borrowers by offering lenders a continuous stream of data on borrowers' account balances. This information is most readily available to commercial banks, but other intermediaries, such as finance companies, also have access to such information at a cost. Using a unique set of data that includes monthly and annual information on small-business borrowers at an anonymous Canadian bank, we find a significant relationship between loans becoming troubled and the number of prior borrowings in excess of collateral. Since the bank monitors the value of collateral (defined as accounts receivable plus inventory) at high frequency through the transactions account of the borrower, this unique access to useful information gives banks an advantage over other lenders. We also find that banks more intensively monitor loans that have a higher number of violations of the collateral limit.