No abstract

The Acute Stress Disorder Scale (ASDS) is a self-report inventory that (a) indexes acute stress disorder (ASD) and (b) predicts posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The ASDS is a 19-item inventory that is based on Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; DSM-IV, American Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria. The ASDS possessed good sensitivity (95%) and specificity (83%) for identifying ASD against the ASD Interview on 99 civilian trauma survivors. Test-retest reliability of the ASDS scores between 2 and 7 days was strong (r = .94). The ASDS predicted 91% of bushfire survivors who developed PTSD and 93% of those who did not; one third of those identified by the ASDS as being at risk did not develop PTSD, however. The ASDS shows promise as a screening instrument to identify acutely traumatized individuals who warrant more thorough assessment for risk of PTSD.

No abstract

One account for the negative effects of rumination on social problem solving (SPS) is the symptom-focus hypothesis, which proposes that focus on symptoms amplifies the vicious cycle between depressed mood and negative cognition. The authors tested a contrasting account, the reduced concreteness hypothesis, which postulates that the abstract thinking typical of rumination impairs SPS. In 40 depressed patients and 40 never-depressed controls, SPS was assessed before and after versions of symptom-focused rumination known to differentially induce abstract versus concrete self-focus (E. Watkins & J. D. Teasdale, 2001). As predicted by reduced concreteness theory, relative to abstract self-focus, concrete self-focus improved SPS in depressed patients, suggesting that the particular mode of symptom-focus, rather than symptom-focus per se, determines the effects of rumination on problem solving.

Three studies are reported showing that emotional responses to stress can be modified by systematic prior practice in adopting particular processing modes. Participants were induced to think about positive and negative scenarios in a mode either characteristic of or inconsistent with the abstract-evaluative mind-set observed in depressive rumination, via explicit instructions (Experiments 1 and 2) and via implicit induction of interpretative biases (Experiment 3), before being exposed to a failure experience. In all three studies, participants trained into the mode antithetical to depressive rumination demonstrated less emotional reactivity following failure than participants trained into the mode consistent with depressive rumination. These findings provide evidence consistent with the hypothesis that processing mode modifies emotional reactivity and support the processing-mode theory of rumination.