This article analyses price setting by hotel establishments in the Spanish islands via an online travel agency. To this end, the author collected information on 572 hotels and tourist apartments and estimated the effects of their characteristics and market conditions on the probability that each establishment would increase or decrease prices and on price variations. The results obtained enabled an examination of the effect of competition and product differentiation on pricing policy. According to the results, the higher the quality of the service provided, the greater the probability of a price rise, and the greater its magnitude. Moreover, a greater difference between the set price and the average price of competitors does not affect the probability of lowering prices. The results therefore suggest that product differentiation is an important issue in the hotel industry.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects on the gender wage gap of women’s access to supervisory jobs within each establishment in the Spanish labor market. Previous empirical studies have found that promoting women to supervisory positions has decreased the wage difference between genders among workers beneath them. However, these studies did not take into account the endogeneity problem associated with job choice. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a switching model to control for this endogeneity problem under certain assumptions. Findings Using matched employer–employee data from a sample of 213,709 workers in the Spanish labor market, the author found that an increase in the proportion of women among supervisors within each establishment significantly widens the wage difference between genders. This study shows that the impact of an increase in women’s power within establishments may well be more limited than other empirical studies suggest. Originality/value The author will use the estimated correlations between unobservables to find out whether the most valued skills for being a supervisor and the skills that make a worker more productive in the workplace are substitutes or complements. Additionally, the author breaks down the effects of the gender composition of supervisory jobs on the wage gap into a direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect measures the impact of women’s representation among supervisors on the wage difference between men and women within the same job, whereas the indirect effect measures the impact of more women reaching supervisory posts on the wage gap induced by its impact on each type of gender segregation.

No abstract

In this article, we present a two‐period model in which one firm operates in two markets: a monopoly and a duopoly. Assuming that this firm has private information on the cross‐price elasticity of demand between the products sold in both markets, it limits its quantity supplied in the monopoly market in order to make its rival in the other market believe that entry into the monopolized market is unprofitable. As a result of this strategy, the average prices observed in both markets increase. This result suggests that the detrimental effects of entry deterrence on consumers' welfare are stronger than those predicted by previous literature.

Unlike previous literature, in which firms compete in the market with the same information, this article analyses a two-period duopoly game in which only one firm is completely informed about the market conditions, whereas the other firm is unaware of one parameter of the demand curve. In this setting, we describe how the informed firm uses its price set in period 1 in order to reveal or to hide its private information and how the uninformed firm uses its own price in period 1 in order to learn the market conditions when they are not revealed by its rival. Specifically, we obtained the conditions under which the informed firm sets a higher price than its optimum in the first period to hide its private information in certain cases and to reveal that information in others. Likewise, this paper describes the conditions under which the uninformed firm sets a lower price than its optimum in period 1 in order to learn the unknown parameter. We found that the informed firm's cost of revealing its private information to its rival is lower than the uninformed firm's cost of learning the market conditions.