Equal channel angular extrusion or pressing (ECAE or ECAP) is a process used in order to impart severe plastic deformations to processed materials with the aim of improving their mechanical properties by reducing the grain size. The grain size reduction leads to mechanical properties improvement. In the present study, a new die configuration is proposed for the ECAE process. The advantage of this die geometry is that it allows us to obtain higher plastic strain in each ECAE passage than traditional ECAE dies. It is important to optimize the die geometry, as the main aim of the ECAE process is to impart severe plastic deformations to the processed materials. Consequently, the higher the deformation, the better the improvement on the mechanical properties of the processed materials. In order to determine how variations on geometry affect the plastic strain of the processed materials finite element modeling (FEM) is used. Both analytical and FEM methods will allow us to affirm that by using this new die configuration it is possible to achieve higher deformation values per ECAE passage.

BackgroundMusculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) that result from poor ergonomic design are one of the occupational disorders of greatest concern in the industrial sector. A key advantage in the primary design phase is to focus on a method of assessment that detects and evaluates the potential risks experienced by the operative when faced with these types of physical injuries. The method of assessment will improve the process design identifying potential ergonomic improvements from various design alternatives or activities undertaken as part of the cycle of continuous improvement throughout the differing phases of the product life cycle.Methodology/Principal FindingsThis paper presents a novel postural assessment method (NERPA) fit for product-process design, which was developed with the help of a digital human model together with a 3D CAD tool, which is widely used in the aeronautic and automotive industries. The power of 3D visualization and the possibility of studying the actual assembly sequence in a virtual environment can allow the functional performance of the parts to be addressed. Such tools can also provide us with an ergonomic workstation design, together with a competitive advantage in the assembly process.ConclusionsThe method developed was used in the design of six production lines, studying 240 manual assembly operations and improving 21 of them. This study demonstrated the proposed method’s usefulness and found statistically significant differences in the evaluations of the proposed method and the widely used Rapid Upper Limb Assessment (RULA) method.

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology.Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Ned Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial.Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness.Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science.

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In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states.Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a fullfledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to become a plausible alternative.My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. Subjective CharacterConscious experiences have a subjective dimension, undergoing them feels some way or, borrowing Nagel's expression, it is like something for the subject of experience to undergo them. When I look at the red apple close to my computer, there is something it is like for me to have this experience. The way it is like for me to have the experience is the phenomenal character of the experience.Theories of consciousness aim at offering a comprehensive account of phenomenal character. One interesting way of facing this task is a divide-and-conquer one (Kriegel 2009; Levine 2001) that begins by making a conceptual distinction between two components of phenomenal character-the qualitative character and the subjective character-and the two associated problems. [W]hen I have my conscious experience of the sky, I must be aware of having it. In this sense, my experience does not just take place in me, it is also for me. (Kriegel 2006, 199) It is often assumed that we can understand any form of awareness as some form or other of representation. I will grant this assumption and focus on the kind of representation required to make sense of the subjective character of the experience: conscious experiences require a certain form of self-representation. My aim in this paper is to explore the logical space for understanding the required sense of self-representation and the problem of the subjective character of the experience in such a way.The expression 'self-representation' is ambiguous: it can mean (i) representation of the state itself or (ii) representation of oneself. This contrast allows me to build a distinction, orthogonal to the well known one between First/Same-Order and Higher-Order (introduced in section 2.1), between what I will call 'Mental-State-Involving theories' and 'SelfInvolving theories'.In section 3 I will defend the Self-Involving view, and in section 4 I will present the 1 This paper focuses on the subjective character and remains neutral on the relation between subjective and qu...